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This dissertation investigates the impact of the market-oriented economic 
reform in China on one aspect of the labor market outcomes—individuals’ access to 
different employment sectors, that is, the state and collective sector, the private 
sector, and the sector of family contract farming. Using the first wave (1989) and the 
fourth wave (1997) of the CHNS data, this study examines the effects of education, 
family background, and gender on the job placement among the employment sectors 
for young workers (age 17 to 24) and the job shifts across the employment sectors for 
older workers (age 25 to 44). The change of these effects on young workers’ job 
placement from 1989 to 1997 is also examined.  
It is found that education is important in determining young workers’ 
employment sectors and older workers’ destination of employment sector if they 
change jobs, and the better-educated workers are more likely to work in the state and 
collective sector. The social capital effect of family background overwhelms the 
  
practice of risk diversification and young workers are more likely to work in the 
employment sector in which they have some family connections. While young 
women have some advantage in entering the private sector than young men, older 
married women are disadvantaged in transferring to the private sector than older 
married men and women farmers are less likely to leave the family farm than male 
farmers.  
The findings suggest that the access to different employment sectors is not 
equally distributed among Chinese workers. The hierarchy of employment sectors is 
reproduced through the procedure that assorts individual workers to different 
employment sectors. In addition to achieved characteristics such as human capital, 
ascribed characteristics such as family background and gender are important factors 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The market-oriented economic reform since 1979 has conspicuously 
transformed the institutional structure of China’s economy. Prior to the reform, China 
was featured as a state-socialist economy. The agricultural production was 
collectivized and the nonagricultural production was nationalized. More importantly, 
the government played a central role in the economy through its control on the 
productions and sales of almost all the agricultural and nonagricultural products. The 
private sector barely existed in the economy (Parish and Whyte 1978; Riskin 1987; 
Selden 1993; Whyte and Parish 1984). The reform has diversified the economic 
institutions of China’s economy by introducing the market economy.  
At the very early stage of the economic reform, the collective agricultural 
production has been dismantled. The farmers’ households have become the unit of 
production since then and are in full charge of the farming land that is contracted to 
them (Knight and Song 1999). In the meantime, the government encouraged the 
development of small private businesses in both urban and rural areas with caution. 
The private sector gradually revived during the economic reform period, and the 
government eventually legitimized the private ownership of businesses, small or large 
(Garnaut and Song 2004). Nevertheless, unlike the Eastern European countries, China 
does not take its state-owned and collective enterprises down to the route of mass 
privatization. Instead, reforms from inside had been the approach to improve the 
performance of the state-owned and collective enterprises during the first 15 years of 
the reform. Even after the large-scale ownership reform began in the mid 1990s, 




owned (Lardy 1998). As a result, the state-socialist economy and the market economy 
coexist in contemporary China. And the proximity to the market economy varies 
among the economic sectors.  
Clearly, having been growing outside the economic planning system of the 
government, the private sector is closest to the market economy. Family farming 
seems to be under the market economy except that the land is still owned by the 
government and equally distributed among farmers’ households. In addition, the 
agricultural production has to bear the burden of “urban bias” resulted from the 
government’s macroeconomic policies for development. Since the state and collective 
sectors are inherited from the pre-reform era, they have maintained many features of 
the state socialist economy and may be the farthest from the market economy. To put 
it together, the private sector, the sector of family farming, and the state/collective 
sector are three segments that operated under different institutional arrangements in 
China’s economy.  
The transformations of the economic institutions during the economic reform 
era have three implications on the process of social stratification and mobility in 
China. First, the transformations have reshaped the structure of the employment 
sectors, which was an important dimension of social stratification in the pre-reform 
era. The establishment of the family farming system and the emergence of the private 
sector provide new opportunities outside the old system. Moreover, the different 
institutional arrangements have affected the monetary and nonmonetary rewards to 
individuals working in each sector. Family farming still suffers from the “urban bias” 




income. The state/collective sector is to a large extent subject to the wage rates set by 
the government. Relatively, the private sector offers more competitive salaries. 
However, the workers of the state/collective sector enjoy many latent benefits such as 
subsidized housing, health care, and pension plan. The lifetime employment was 
guaranteed in the state/collective sector until mid 1990s. For farmers’ households, 
they may keep the land allocated to them as long as they continue working on it. 
Therefore, due to different institutional arrangements, each sector provides to its 
workers a different package of rewards that puts different weights on income, latent 
benefits, and security. The variations of the rewarding systems among the 
state/collective sector, the private sector, and the sector of family farming suggest that 
the employment in different sectors means different structure of opportunities. The 
access to different sectors is therefore important for understanding social stratification 
in the reform era. 
Secondly, the introduction of the market economy has changed the 
mechanisms of the social stratification in the reform era. The market transition theory 
argues that the market-oriented economic reform will shift the control over resources 
progressively from political disposition to market institutions. Consequently, human 
capital, which is valued in the market economy, will become more important in the 
process of social stratification in China (Nee 1989; Nee 1996). In addition, the 
economic reform has renewed the role of family in economic activities (Entwisle et 
al. 2000). On the one hand, the family may serve as the pool of social capital to 
facilitate the economic advancement of each family member. On the other hand, the 




of the family as a whole. Moreover, the demand for female labor has been affected by 
the economic reform. While the expansion of market economy may have produced 
more work opportunities for women, the discrimination against women in the labor 
markets may have also risen due to the declining role of the government in promoting 
gender equality in the workplaces (Bian 2002; Whyte 2000). It seems that the major 
mechanisms of social stratification—human capital, family background, and 
gender—have experienced some changes during the economic reform era. Therefore, 
it is necessary to examine the influences of those factors on configuring the social 
stratification of contemporary China.  
Thirdly, the economic reform has eroded the rigorous labor system and led to 
the rise of the labor market (Meng 2000; Tomba 2002), which increases the 
opportunities of social mobility via job mobility. Before the economic reform, both 
the urban and rural labor forces were under close administration of central and local 
governments through the rural collectives and urban work organizations. Labor 
markets did not exist and job mobility across employment sectors was rare. Since the 
economic reform, the resurrection of the private sector in the economy has been 
increasingly providing nonagricultural job opportunities that are beyond government 
control. The reestablishment of farmers’ households as the unit of agricultural 
production essentially liberates the rural labor forces from the control of the 
collective. The reforms of the state-owned and collective enterprises have been 
gradually relieving the workers’ dependency on their work organizations. Labor 
markets have started to emerge in China’s economy and job mobility is more 




In the context of China’s market-oriented economic reform, the aim of this 
dissertation is to understand how the three mechanisms of social stratification—
education, family background, and gender—have influenced the access to the private 
sector, and the sector of family farming during the economic reform era. Specifically, 
I address the following major questions: 
1. Is there any differentiation on the access to different employment sectors 
among individuals with different levels of educational achievement? Has the 
influence of education increased as the economic reform proceeds?    
2. Does family background affect individuals’ chances to access different 
employment sectors? If so, is it a social capital effect or an effect of family 
coordination? Has the effect of the family background declined when the 
market economy expands?  
3. Is there any gender difference on the access to different employment 
sectors? Has the gender effect changed with the evolution of the economic 
reform?  
To answer the research questions, this research uses the longitudinal data 
obtained from the first wave (1989) and the fourth wave (1997) of the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). Recognizing that entering an employment sector at the 
very early stage of one’s career is different from transferring to an employment sector 
from another sector at the later stage of the career, I do separated analysis on the job 
placement of young workers (age 17 to 24) and the job mobility of older workers (age 




This dissertation contributes to the debate on how the market transition has 
been changing the process of social stratification in China in the following aspects. 
Theoretically, the debate is concentrated on the rising influence of human capital and 
the declining power of political capital in determining the socioeconomic status of 
individuals (Cao and Nee 2002; Nee 1989; Nee 1991; Nee 1996; Walder 2002; Wu 
and Xie 2003; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhou 2000a). Other mechanisms of social 
stratification are largely ignored in the debate. This research views family background 
and gender as equally important as human capital in the social stratification in 
contemporary China. In addition, the majority of the empirical studies developed 
around the debate focus on one specific outcome of social stratification, that is, 
income inequality. However, considering that the labor markets in China are 
essentially segmented (Bian 1994) and the entrance into the core sectors constitutes 
the primary goal of status attainment (Lin and Bian 1991), it is necessary to 
investigate the procedure that sorts individuals into different positions of the labor 
markets. This research attempts to fill the gap by focusing on job placement and job 
shift across employment sectors as the outcome variables. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
introduces the contextual setting of the research. I first review the establishment of 
the hierarchy of employment sectors through a series of economic and social 
institutions under the state-socialist economy. Then I introduce the transformations of 
the employment sectors via institutional innovation and modification during the 




structure of the employment sectors in contemporary China and the implications on 
social stratification in the reform era.  
 Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical background of the research and develops a 
series of the research hypotheses. I begin with the theory of labor market 
segmentation and the market transition debate. Then I review the effects of education, 
family background, and gender on job placement and job mobility, which is followed 
by the research hypotheses.  
Chapter 4 describes the data, analytical samples, dependent, independent and 
control variables, and statistical methods used in the empirical analysis of the 
dissertation. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the bivariate and multivariate analysis on the 
job placement across employment sectors among the youths aged 17 to 24. At first, I 
discuss the change of young workers’ employment sectors over time. Then the effects 
of education, family background, and gender on the entry of different employment 
sectors are examined. In addition, the change of those effects over time are 
investigated. Lastly, the effects of control variables are also discussed briefly.  
Chapter 6 talks about the results of the bivariate and multivariate analysis on 
job shifts across employment sectors among workers aged 25 to 44. The overall 
mobility rate and the differentiations of cross-sector mobility rate by original 
employment sectors are first discussed. The directions of the cross-sector job mobility 
are also examined. Then I discuss the effects of education, family background, and 




employment sector. The effects of control variables are briefly presented at the end of 
the chapter.  
Chapter 7 draws conclusions on the patterns of job placement and job shifts 
across employment sectors in China. The implications of the findings on the social 










Chapter 2: The Structure of Employment Sectors in China 
 
This chapter will first review the institutionalization of the hierarchy of the 
employment sectors in China from 1949 to 1978. Next, the transformation of the old 
employment sectors and the emergence of the new sectors since the launch of the 
economic reform in 1979 are examined in details. At the end, the possible impacts of 
the reform on the structure of the employment sectors and therefore the process of 
social stratification are discussed.  
The Hierarchy of Employment Sectors in the Pre-Reform Era 
China’s employment system under the state-socialist economy before the 
economic reform was characterized by immense disparity and high-degree 
segmentation of the agricultural (rural) and nonagricultural (urban) sectors. The 
nonagricultural sector was no doubt superior to the agricultural sector in terms of 
income, benefits, and prestige. The divide between the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors was formalized during the mid and late 1950s, shortly after 
the inauguration of the socialist regime in 1949. A series of institutions have 
contributed to the establishment and continuity of such a hierarchy of the employment 
sectors in pre-reform China. Fundamentally, the inequality between the agricultural 
and nonagricultural sector was the consequence of the government’s development 
strategy of focusing on the rapid growth of industry, especially heavy industry. As to 
the segregation of the employment in the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, the 
collectivization of agriculture in rural areas and the nationalization of industry and 




of the government. In addition, the nationwide household registration (hukou) system 
and the rationing of basic necessities in urban areas successfully limited the 
geographical mobility of the population, especially from rural to urban areas.  
The development strategy of the Chinese government after 1949 was to 
promote rapid industrialization in urban areas. Guided by this strategy, the 
government’s investment in agriculture and agriculture-related industries was never 
high. Its share in the total national investment hit the highest point (21.3%) in 1962 
immediately after the famine, but it gradually fell to about 10 percent in 1975 (Riskin 
1987). Moreover, to control the cost of food and other raw materials for urban 
industrial growth, the Chinese government deployed the compulsory procurement 
system in 1953 to buy agricultural products from farmers at a low price (Chan 1994). 
Resulting from this discrimination, there was a large income gap between agricultural 
and nonagricultural sectors on the eve of the economic reform (Riskin 1987). 
Estimates of pre-reform personal incomes in China put the average urban-rural per 
capita income ratio in 1978 between 2.5 and 3 to 1, excluding the urban subsidies in 
urban incomes. The ratio rises to about 6 to 1 after including the subsidies in the 
estimates of income. Additionally, the social security system (e.g. medical insurance, 
pension, and paid maternity leave) was only available to employees of the 
nonagricultural sector (United Nations Development Programme 1999). The distinct 
superiority of the nonagricultural sector inevitably created a desire among farmers to 
move to the urban nonagricultural sector (Parish and Whyte 1978). However, the 
mobility across employment sectors was extremely low in pre-reform China because 




Under the collective agricultural production (Knight and Song 1999; Parish 
and Whyte 1978; Riskin 1987; Selden 1993), land became the property of the 
collective. Besides, draft animals, large farm implements, orchards, fishponds, and 
forestry were collectivized with a small amount of compensation paid to the 
individual owners. Corresponding to the ownership of the means of production, the 
collective was responsible for following the government’s regulations on the 
production and sale of grain and other farm products and paying the taxes to the state. 
Within the collective, the work-points system was adapted to calculate the labor-days 
individual farmers spent on collective farming and other tasks to determine the 
income for each person after the harvest. Grain was also distributed among the 
farmers after deducting the amount sold or given to the state and the amount withheld 
by the collective for future use. The distribution of grain could be linked with the 
work-points, or simply based on the head counts of each household. Although farmers 
were sometimes allowed to retain small private plots to grow vegetables and raise a 
few domestic animals, their major source of income and grain came from the 
collective farm. Therefore, the collectivization of the agricultural production bound 
the farmers to the land.  
While the collectivization of agriculture took place in the countryside, the 
urban economy underwent the socialist transformation (Riskin 1987). By 1956, most 
private owners of business gave up their ownership to the state under the pressure 
from the government. They were assigned jobs in their own business and allowed to 
retain a profit of 5 percent of the value of their assets for ten years. Individual 




governments. The urban economy was dominated by the state sector and 
supplemented by the collective sector1 in the following 20 years after the socialist 
transformation (Selden, 1993:165, Table 6.2). The labors bureaus were set up to 
allocate labor and to administer wages in the state and collective sectors (Knight and 
Song 2005). Job assignments were based on the employment plans of central or local 
government. Neither workers nor work organizations had a say in choosing their 
employers or employees.2 The wage rates of the workers were determined by the 
grade system (administrative personnel were put into twenty salary grades, 
technicians into seventeen grades, and manual workers into eight grades), which 
varied slightly by region, industry, and occupation. In addition, the work 
organizations of the state and collective sectors were responsible for providing 
housing, health care, pension, and other welfares to the employees (Whyte and Parish 
1984). Consequently the workers of the state and collective sectors were closely tied 
to their work organizations. Since the state and collective sectors predominated the 
urban economy and the private sector was almost extinguished under the state 
socialist economy, the government’s administration of the job allocation and wage 
rates essentially means that the urban labor force in pre-reform China was under the 
full control of the government. 
In addition to the close control of the labor force within the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sector, the mobility between these two sectors was highly restrained 
                                                 
1 The distinction between the state and the collective sector is the property rights relationship between 
the work organizations and the state. Work organizations in the state sector, including government 
agencies, public organizations, and state-owned enterprises, which are the property of the state. Work 
organizations in the collective sector are the property of the collective and often affiliated with or 
sponsored by a local government.  
 
2 Individuals with resources would use their connections to find themselves better jobs. Even so, all the 




by the government through the rationing of necessities in urban areas and the 
household registration system. The household registration system served as the 
administrative instrument to control the rural-to-urban migration. All households 
were registered at the locale of their usual residence and classified into either 
agricultural or nonagricultural households when the system was first set up. Any 
change of permanent residence required official approval under the regulation of 
household registration. Since the government was extremely concerned about the 
population growth in cities, the permanent rural-to-urban migration could only be 
granted when a rural resident was officially recruited by the state sector through the 
few channels authorized by the government, including professional or college 
education, serving time in the military, or land requisition for urban development 
(Chan 1994; Goldstein and Wang 1996; Wu and Treiman 2004).  
If the household registration system put the legal rural-to-urban migration 
under the control of the government, the urban rationing system helped block the 
“illegal” migration—the migration not sanctioned by the government. As the 
industrialization was under way in the early 1950s, the scarcity of grain was soon felt 
in the cities and the government decided that rationing was necessary to stabilize the 
urban society (Solinger 1999). And the rationing system was later expanded to other 
foods and necessities, including meat, egg, milk, oil, cloth, match, kerosene and other 
goods. Because the ration cards and coupons were only issued to the urban residents, 
it was unlikely for the rural migrants to survive in the urban areas without the 
authorization of the government. Working together, the household registration system 




from rural to urban areas in China. As a result, the growth rate of the urban 
population in China under the state-socialist economy was very low. In 1958, the 
urban population accounted for 16.2 percent of the total population in China. 
Amazingly, by 1978, the proportion of urban population had only increased to 17.9 
percent (Chan 1994). By then, the level of urbanization of China significantly lagged 
behind the level of industrialization of the nation (Chan 1992).3   
To sum it up, the employment sectors were stratified into agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors in pre-reform China. The nonagricultural sector benefited 
from higher wages and many government subsidies and therefore its employees 
enjoyed better income, more welfare, and higher prestige in the society. The rigorous 
control of the mobility across sectors further intensified the hierarchy of the 
employment sectors. There is no doubt that the employment sector was an important 
dimension of social stratification in pre-reform China. 
Reforms of the Employment Sectors  
With the launch of the economic reform in 1979, the employment sectors in 
China have greatly changed. First, the agricultural sector was transformed. The 
collective agricultural production has been dismantled and replaced by family 
contract farming. In the meantime, township and village enterprises and private 
businesses have developed rapidly in rural economy. Secondly, the state and 
collective sectors of nonagricultural production have been experiencing minor to 
                                                 
3 However, even with the strict administrative regulations on rural-to-urban migration, some rural 
residents did find a way to work in the state sector without changing their household registration status. 
According to Walder (1986), there were 9 million temporary workers from rural areas working in the 
state owned enterprises in 1980. It should be noted that it was a very small fraction of the rural 




major reforms over time to improve their competence and efficiency. Thirdly, the 
private sector has been resurrected in the urban economy. In addition to the reforms 
of the employment sectors, the institutions controlling the population mobility of the 
nation have been changed. The urban rationing system was terminated, and the 
household registration system has gone through some revisions.  
Rapid Transformation of the Agricultural Sector 
The economic reforms in rural China started from the rapid change of 
agricultural production. In the late 1970s, a few rural areas started to experiment with 
the idea of contracting grain output to individual households,4 which was quickly 
embraced by many farmers with enthusiasm (Knight and Song 1999). In 1980, the 
central government gave permission to the practice of the “household responsibility 
system”, which is essentially a contract system between the government and farmers’ 
households in agricultural production. Under the system, draft animals, tools and 
equipment are divided among households. Land is fairly distributed to farmers’ 
households on an equal per capita basis.5 As an exchange, farmers’ households are 
obligated to the delivery of mandatory quotes of yields on the land and responsible 
for paying agricultural tax and fees contributing to collective services. After fulfilling 
those obligations, farmers’ households have the rights over the residual outputs from 
the land. They may be sold at above-quota prices to the government or at usually 
higher prices to anyone in the free market. The work-points system from the 
                                                 
4 The idea and the practice were not unknown to Chinese farmers. In 1962, the central government 
allowed the contracting of output between the production team and farmers’ households as an effort to 
recover the agricultural production after the 3-year famine. But the policy was soon abolished as the 
Cultural Revolution began in 1966 (Riskin, 1987).  




collective agriculture era is eliminated. The “household responsibility system” 
quickly spread. By 1983, 98 percent of the production teams (now administrative 
villages) had adopted this system (Riskin 1987). Since then, farmers’ households 
have become the unit of production after two decades of collective agricultural 
production. As a result, farmers’ households regain their autonomy of allocating their 
resources, including labor forces, within the households to pursuit economic 
efficiency.  
In addition to the establishment of the “household responsibility system”, the 
mandatory procurement system has been phased out since the economic reform 
began. In the early 1980s, the procurement price was raised significantly by the 
central government to increase price incentive for agricultural production. In 1985, 
the central government introduced “contract purchasing”, by which the government 
would negotiate purchase prices before each planting season and the subsidized 
agricultural inputs were tied to the fulfillment of quotas under contract. Farmers could 
choose not to sign the procurement contracts for most agricultural products, but 
mandatory quotas continued for three main crops (grain, cotton, and edible oil) and 
farmers had to sign the contracts (Knight and Song 1999). Later on, farmers were 
allowed to pay a fee to forgo the contracts if they did not want to plant the crops 
under government contract.  
The “household responsibility system” of agricultural production released 
surplus labors, which was present in collective agriculture but was camouflaged by 
the work-points system. Naturally, farmers’ households soon went beyond 




central government acknowledged the importance of rural industries in absorbing 
rural labor and increasing rural incomes and encouraged the development of township 
and village enterprises by urging government of all levels to support them (Chen et al. 
1994). The number of township and village enterprises has increased from 6 million 
in 1984 to over 23 million in 1996. Although the size of township and village 
enterprises is usually small, the number of employees has increased from 52 million 
in 1984 to 135 million in 1996 (State Statistical Bureau, P.R.C. 1998: 427). In 
addition, private businesses have prospered in rural areas as well. Some farmers’ 
households specialized in the more profitable outputs of agricultural production, such 
as cash crops and livestock. Other farmers’ households chose to invest in businesses 
in manufacturing and services. In 1997, there were about 6 million persons working 
for or investing in the private enterprises and over 35 million self-employed 
individuals in rural areas (State Statistical Bureau, P.R.C. 1997: 426).   
In brief, the agricultural sector has experienced significant transformation 
since the economic reform. The most fundamental change is the termination of the 
collective agricultural production and the establishment of the household as the basic 
unit of production in rural China. In other words, rural laborers do not depend on the 
collectives any more but instead support themselves. Meanwhile, the township and 
village enterprises and private businesses in rural areas have grown rapidly during the 
reform era and have been changing the employment structure in rural areas. However, 
there are great regional variations on the development of rural industrialization 
(Watson and Wu 1994). Therefore, the surplus labors in rural areas, which became 




Gradual Transition of the State and Collective Sectors 
The reform of the state-owned and collective enterprises is gradual. Lardy 
(1998) spelled out three stages of the reform in the state and collective sectors. The 
first stage was in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the policy of profit retention 
was adopted to increase the autonomy of enterprise managers, largely by increasing 
their authority over the allocation of the profits. The second phase started in the mid-
1980s. At that time, the long-term contract between enterprises and their bureaucratic 
superiors was introduced, under which the deliveries of profits, taxes, and other 
financial targets by enterprises were clearly specified. Meanwhile, the enterprises 
were given more autonomy on purchase of materials and equipment, sale of output, 
and other aspects of operation.6 The third stage began in 1993. The government was 
determined to apply the modern corporate governance to the state-owned and 
collective enterprises and put them in the marketplace to compete on equal terms. 
Most importantly, the diversification of the ownership of the state-owned and 
collective enterprises was approved. The ownership reform has been accelerated since 
the fall of 1997. Because of the reform, many small state-owned and collective 
enterprises were privatized. Large and medium enterprises were converted into 
limited liability or shareholding companies, although in almost all cases the state is 
the largest shareholder.  
In tandem with the enterprise reforms, the labor reforms in state-owned and 
collective enterprises have been conducted since the late 1970s (Meng 2000; Tomba, 
2002). The initial stage of labor reform focused on the wage structure. Under the 
profit retention system, enterprises were allowed to use a certain percentage of their 
                                                 




profits for bonuses or “floating wages”, which was linked to the performance and 
productivity of individual workers and their teams. Following the restructuring of the 
wage system, the labor contract system introduced in 1986 was the second step of 
labor reform. Under the regulations of the labor contract system, the state-owned and 
collective enterprises were required to openly recruit workers from society and all the 
new entrants were to be categorized as contract workers. The implementation of the 
labor contract system has officially ended the institution of lifetime employment in 
the state and collective sectors of urban economy. Besides, it gives employers of the 
state and collective sectors some flexibility in hiring. Many enterprises started to use 
examinations and interviews in the recruitment process. However, the labor contract 
system did not have an immediate impact on the existing employees of the state-
owned and collective enterprises. Enterprises still had to keep redundant workers.7 
Even for the new entrants, the contract usually became continuous employment. The 
situation did not change much until the mid 1990s, when the government identified 
overstaffing as one of the most important reasons for the inefficiency of state-owned 
and collective enterprises. Since then, many workers have been laid off from the state 
and collective sectors.8  
In summary, the reforms of the state and collective sectors in the 1980s did 
not significantly change the labor system inherited from the pre-reform era. The 
dependent relationship between workers and their work organizations remained 
                                                 
7 A case study on the successful downsizing efforts made by a large state-owned enterprise 
demonstrates it (Freund, 1998).   
8 In most cases, the laid-off workers still kept their official employment relationship with the 
enterprises they used to work at, and the enterprises were responsible for paying the social security 
funds for the laid-off workers and providing them a basic livelihood allowance. Therefore, lay-off is 




intact. To some extent, it became even more intense because the financial 
performance of the work organizations directly affected the income and welfare of the 
workers through the retained profits. Although the attempt to break up the workers’ 
dependency on the work organizations through the labor contract system was made in 
the 1980s, the lag of the reforms in social security, health care, and housing system 
still closely tied the workers of the state and collective sectors to their work 
organizations until the ownership reform of state-owned and collective enterprises in 
the mid 1990s.  
Growth of the Private Sector 
The private sector was slowly revived in the urban economy with much 
caution on the government’s part (Garnaut and Song 2004). There are three major 
sources of the growth of the private sector. The first one is the “indigenous” private 
business growing up gradually during the post-reform era. The second is the 
“transplanted” private business coming from capitalist economies. The third one is 
the “transformed” private business because of the ownership reform of state-owned 
and collective enterprises.  
The “indigenous” private sector originated from the government’s 
encouragement of self-employment in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Chinese 
cities were facing the problem of youth unemployment after the return of a large 
number of urban youths sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976). That was the beginning of the revival of the private sector in urban economy. 
However, until 1988 this “indigenous” private sector was confined to self-




government regulations. The changes in legislation and government regulations 
afterwards acknowledged the legal status of private enterprises hiring more 
employees (Song 2004; Tang and Parish 2000). In spite of many institutional 
constraints, the “indigenous” private sector flourished in the 1980s. By 1988, the 
share of self-employment has risen to about 10 percent in national employment 
(Garnaurt and Song 2004).  
One important component of the economic reform in China is the open-door 
policy, which welcomes foreign investment after 20 years of the self-reliance in 
economic development. Foreign companies either set up branches in China or work 
jointly with previously state-owned or collective enterprises. The direct investment 
from foreign countries has largely been attracted to labor-intensive, export-orientated 
industries and geographically concentrated on the eastern provinces. The employment 
provided by foreign firms has increased significantly over time. In 1991, about 1 
percent of urban workers were working in foreign firms. By 1997, the percentage had 
almost tripled (Chen et al. 1994).  
The nationwide privatization of state-owned and collective enterprises started 
in 1995 after the central government formed the policy of “keeping the large and 
letting the small go”, although local experiments on the ownership reform began a 
few years earlier. The state decided to keep 500 to 1,000 large state-owned and 
collective enterprises and allow the smaller ones to be leased out or sold to private 
owners or transformed into employee-held firms or cooperatives (Yao 2004). 
Considering the complexities of privatization, usually the procedure starts from the 




of the purposes of the ownership reform is to deal with the problem of redundant 
workers in the state and collective sectors. Therefore, many previous employees of 
the privatized enterprises were either laid-off or had become unemployed after 
receiving a certain amount of severance pay.  
To sum it up, the growth of the private sector in China’s post-reform economy 
is evident. The multiple origins of the private sector result in the heterogeneity of the 
sector. It includes self-employed small business owners, employees of foreign or joint 
venture firms, employees of domestic private firms, and entrepreneurs who are the 
owners of those private firms. In spite of its different origins, the private sector 
provides alternative employment opportunities outside the state and collective sectors. 
As the sector thrives, the profitability of starting one’s own business and the higher 
salaries in private firms make private sector attractive. It is observed that more urban 
residents are debating between a low-income but stable job in the state and collective 
sectors and a high income but no-benefit and low-security job in the private sector 
(Tang and Parish 2000).  
Changing Policies toward Rural-to-Urban Population Mobility 
To accommodate the economic transformation, the urban rationing system and 
the household registration system have experienced reforms since the economic 
reform began. The reforms have partially lifted the institutional barriers on the 
population mobility from rural to urban areas in China.  
Following the reforms in agricultural and nonagricultural productions in the 
early 1980s, grains and many other necessities became easily available in the free 




of higher prices, the necessities in the free market were affordable for most urban 
residents because of higher incomes with the onset of reforms in urban economy. In 
addition, grains and other necessities in the free market often possessed better quality 
than those that came with ration coupons. Consequently, many urban residents have 
stopped using ration coupons in the 1980s. A large number of those coupons were 
illicitly exchanged or sold in the black markets. The free market of grains and other 
necessities and the black markets of ration coupons made it feasible for rural residents 
to survive in the cities without the official urban residency. The situation has become 
even better after 1992, when the cities put an end to the ration coupons. 
Consequently, food and other necessities once available just for permanent urban 
residents were made completely accessible to everyone (Solinger 1999).  
The household registration system is still in effect. However, its function in 
controlling population mobility has greatly declined through systemic changes 
(Solinger, 1999). The first sign on the flexibility of the household registration system 
was that, in 1984, the government allowed the rural residents equipped with funds 
and self-supplied grains to convert their registration status from agricultural to 
nonagricultural if they wished to do work and business in small towns. About the 
same time, major cities relaxed the rules about migrants from rural areas. It was not 
necessary for a migrant to come in under a group contract between an urban work 
organization and a rural collective. Additionally, temporary residents were allowed to 
stay in a city for six months before having to renew their certificates. These two 
measures are departures from the regulations set up in 1958. In 1988, the central 




cities by recommending it as a development strategy. Soon after that 
recommendation, the state-owned enterprises were permitted to sign contracts directly 
with individual temporary workers from rural areas (it had to be group contract 
before), which undoubtedly encourages more emigration from rural areas.   
Although the revisions of some regulations of the household registration 
system have gradually eased the migration from rural to urban areas in the reform era, 
it is still very difficult for rural-to-urban migrants to convert their registration status 
from agricultural to nonagricultural in large towns (e.g. county town) and major 
cities. Without the permanent residency, migrants (including those with 
nonagricultural registration status but coming from other cities) are discriminated in 
many aspects of urban life, including accessibility to job opportunities, public 
education, health care, and subsidized housing.  
Changed Structure of Employment Sectors in the Reform Era 
From the changes discussed above, we can see that the economic reform has 
been reshaping the structure of employment sectors in China since 1979. On the one 
hand, the pre-reform hierarchy of employment sectors, featured by the superiority of 
nonagricultural (urban) sector over the agricultural (rural) sector, has been shaken 
loose in the reform period for at least three reasons. First, new employment 
opportunities that are not directly controlled by the government have emerged in both 
rural and urban areas. The township and village enterprises and privately owned 
businesses in rural areas and the revival of the private sector in urban economy have 
provided work opportunities outside the traditional employment sectors for both rural 




agriculture sector, state sector, and urban collective sector) have been more or less 
transformed so that individual workers are not tied to their work organizations as 
closely as before. Thirdly, the obliteration of the urban rationing system and the 
relaxation of the regulations on migration have facilitated geographic mobility of all 
sorts: including rural-to-rural, urban-to-urban, and rural-to-urban migration. 
Consequently, the employment structure has been changed since 1979.  
The trends of the frequency and percentage distributions of rural employees in 
agricultural production from 1979 to 1997 illustrate the structural change of rural 
employment during the reform era.9 From Table 2.1, we can see that the rural labor 
force has been growing constantly since 1979. However, the number of individuals 
working in agricultural production has started to decline since 1992. Moreover, the 
proportion of rural employees in agricultural production has been falling continuously 
since 1979. In 1979, about 90 percent of the rural employees were working in 
agricultural production. The proportion dropped to about 80 percent in 1989 and 
further went down to 65 percent in 1997. Evidently, there has been an expansion of 
employment in the nonagricultural sector among the rural labor force during the 
reform era and the pace of change seems to have picked up since 1989.  
In urban areas, the size of the labor force has been growing in the reform era 
(Table 2.2). The number of workers in the private sector has increased rapidly since 
1979. The size of the state sector continued to grow initially, albeit at a slower pace.  
However, after 1993 the growth of that sector has stopped. The collective sector has 
                                                 
9 The available statistics do not make the distinction between agricultural production contracted to 
farmers’ households and other forms (collective or cooperative) of agricultural production. 
Considering that the latter is only a very small proportion in China’s contemporary agricultural 
production, the trend of agricultural production can be seen as a proximate of the trend of family 




undergone a similar transformation, except that it has begun to shrink in size since 
1993. As a result, the size of the state and collective sectors combined has been 
declining since 1993. Figure 2.2 displays the change of the composition of urban 
employment sectors during the reform era. It is clear that in the 1980s when the 
reforms in the state and collective sectors were relatively moderate and the 
government was still cautious on the development of the private sector, the relative 
size of the state sector remained about the same (70%) after its initial decline in the 
early 1980s and both the collective and the private sector have grown a little bit 
comparing to their relative sizes in 1979. The change has obviously picked up its 
speed in the 1990s. The relative sizes of the state and the collective sector have been 
dropping while the private sector is expanding. By 1997, about 62 percent of the 
urban workers were in the state sector, about 16 percent in the collective sector, and 
more than 21 percent in the private sector.  
On the other hand, however, the economic reform does not erase the 
disparities between traditional employment sectors—agricultural (rural) versus 
nonagricultural (urban)—in spite of the reforms within each sector. As shown in 
Table 2.3, the per capita income has been rising in both urban and rural areas since 
1979. However, the urban-rural gap in per capita income is persistent during the 
economic reforms. Figure 2.3 presents the urban-rural ratio of per capita income from 
1979 to 1997. When the economic reform began, the urban income was about 2.4 
times higher than the rural income. The head start of rural reform helped close the 
urban-rural income gap during the early stage of the reform era. But the trend did not 




surpassed the level of 1979. The gap had further widened in the following three years 
and then started to drop a bit. In 1997, the average income of urban residents was 
about 2.5 times higher than that of rural residents.  
The continuity of urban-rural disparity in income might be partially attributed 
to the gradualism of China’s economic reform. Many institutions from the pre-reform 
era have remained in place following the reforms. Among these, the most important is 
the household registration system because the provision of many social services (e.g. 
education, health care) and welfares (e.g. subsidized housing, state-funded pension 
and medical care insurance) in urban areas are still confined to officially registered 
urban residents (Solinger 1999; Yang and Zhou 1999). Another reason for the urban-
rural income inequality is the succession of the “urban bias” in the government’s 
policy in promoting economic development in the reform era. The government 
continued to invest much more in urban development than in rural development 
(Yang and Zhou 1999).  
In addition, the rise of new employment sectors has added some complexities 
to the picture. In rural areas, while wage work has been found to be an important 
route to improve income for ordinary rural residents (Knight and Song 1999), starting 
a business is no doubt the fast track to becoming rich (Cook 2000). However, the land 
tenure system after the economic reform does not encourage rural residents to 
completely give up family farming. Farmers’ households under the “household 
responsibility system” have the rights to use the land assigned to them. But they 
would have to return the land to local authorities if they had permanently left 




would give up not only the future land earnings but also the economic security 
provided by the land because there is always the risk of losing an off-farm job or 
losing money in business and rural residents are not entitled to social welfares that are 
available to low income urban households whose official household registration status 
is “nonagricultural”. As a result, except for a few highly industrialized rural areas 
where farming lands have been massively taken over to build factories, family 
contract farming is still an indispensable economic activity for most rural households.  
The situation in urban areas is similarly, if not more, complex. During the 
reform era, the wage levels have been rising in all of the three employment sectors of 
urban economy (Table 2.4). However, there are significant wage gaps among the 
employment sectors. Figure 2.4 displays the private-state and collective-state wage 
ratios since 1979. Relative to the state sector, private sector has always had a higher 
wage rate after the economic reform started. The wage gap between these two sectors 
had been widened until 1993. Since then, the gap has been stable. By 1997, the wage 
rate of the private sector is 1.3 times higher than that of the state sector. In contrast, 
the collective sector has constantly suffered lower wage rate compared to the wage 
level of the state sector. The collective-state wage ratio fluctuated in the 1980s and 
further dropped in the 1990s. In 1997, the average wage of the collective sector is 
only 67 percent of the wage of the state sector. Although the private sector enjoys the 
highest wage rate, the average levels of insurance and welfare benefits are much 
higher in the state sector than in the private sector. The collective sector does not have 
the advantage on the welfare benefits over the private sector. However, the state and 




rarely does so (Zhou et al. 1997). Therefore, the state and collective sectors provide 
more latent benefits than the private sector. In addition, job security was not a 
problem at all in state and collective sectors until more mid-sized enterprises were 
involved in the ownership reform in 1995. Even so, the jobs in government agencies, 
public institutions, and large state-owned enterprises with good records on financial 
performance are still safe.  
The changes in the structure of employment sector from the pre-reform to the 
reform era are summarized in Figure 2.5. The economic reform has restructured the 
employment sectors of China in following ways. The first and most obvious one is 
the emergence of new sectors. Specifically, the growth of the private sector in urban 
economy and the nonagricultural sector in rural economy has changed the 
composition of the employment sectors in the reform era. The second aspect is about 
the mobility across employment sectors. Compared to pre-reform era, job mobility 
has become relatively easier because of the partial reforms of the household 
registration system and the elimination of the urban rationing system. Lastly, relative 
to the clear-cut division of employment sectors in the pre-reform era, the hierarchy of 
the employment sectors has become more complicated by the diversified rewards 
across employment sectors. On the one hand, the newly emerged private sector seems 
to offer its workers the highest income. On the other hand, family contract farming 
can be considered the most secure job. It should be noted that the relative position of 
the state and collective sectors to the private sector is a bit uncertain due to the 




To conclude, the segmentation of the employment sectors based on a series of 
economic and social institutions had made the employment sector an important 
dimension of social stratification in pre-reform China. Although the structure of the 
employment sectors has changed in the reform era due to the transformation of the 
old employment sectors and the emergence of the new employment sectors, the 
differentiations on monetary and non-monetary rewards between the employment 
sectors do not diminish. Rather, the different institutional arrangements among the 
state/collective sector, the private/other sector, and the sector of family contract 
farming lead to the differences in the rewarding system of each employment sector. 
Consequently, working in different employment sectors means the differentiations in 
the opportunity structures faced by individual workers. From that perspective, the 
employment sectors continue to function as an important dimension of social 
stratification in reform-era China. Therefore, the access to the employment sectors 
deserves to be investigated to gain a better understanding on the impacts of the 
economic reform on the process of social stratification in contemporary Chinese 







Chapter 3: Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
From Chapter 2, it is clear that China has experienced profound 
transformation on the structure of employment sectors in recent years. The theory of 
labor market segmentation provides the conceptual tool to understand the structure of 
employment sectors and its role in the social stratification in China. The market 
transition debate offers the analytical tools to explore the changing mechanisms of 
social stratification in the reform era. In this chapter, I will first review the theory of 
labor market segmentation and discuss its relevance in China’s context. Then the 
market transition theory and the critiques of the theory will be reviewed. The 
limitations of the debate and the empirical studies evolved around the debate will be 
discussed. Lastly, the research hypotheses on the impacts of education, family 
background, and gender on the job placement and job shift across employment 
sectors will be developed based on the previous literature.  
The Segmentation of Labor Markets 
The concept of “segmented labor markets” was invented as the theoretical 
instrument that provides a different approach from the classical economics to 
understand the persistence of inequality of labor market outcomes in market 
economies. According to the classical economic theory, the labor market is perfectly 
competitive. Wages respond to changes in supply and demand, and workers can move 
freely in different parts of the market in response to those changes. The observed 
inequality of labor market outcomes (e.g. wage) is a transient phenomenon and it will 




as the minimum wage policy, are viewed as distortions of the market price of labor 
and highly discouraged by the classical economics. The theory of segmented labor 
markets, however, points out that labor markets are actually divided into distinct 
segments—the primary sector and the secondary sector. The primary sector is 
composed of jobs with relatively high wages, good work conditions, chances of 
career advancement, and employment stability. On the contrary, the secondary sector 
tends to offer jobs with low wages, poor work conditions, little chance of promotion, 
and high turnover among the workers. Therefore, the inequality of labor market 
outcomes is determined by the segmented structure of labor markets. Workers of the 
primary sector are always better off than workers of the secondary sector, even if they 
share the same characteristics or have the same occupation (Kalleberg and Sorensen 
1979).  
More importantly, workers are not randomly placed to the primary and 
secondary sectors. The division between the primary and the secondary sector usually 
overlaps with workers’ ascribed characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or gender. In 
classical and neoclassical economics, the differences of labor market outcomes 
between race, ethnicity, or gender after controlling productivity-relevant 
characteristics are attributed to employers’ “tastes for discrimination” (Becker 1971). 
The discrimination is considered to be correctable in the competitive labor markets by 
classical and neoclassical economic theorists. According to them, when some 
employers profit from hiring workers of the discriminated groups at a lower price (i.e. 
wage), other employers will take the same strategy and start hiring workers from 




of those workers will rise to the point that there is no difference between them and 
other workers if their productivity is at the same level. Different from the classical 
and neoclassical economics, the segmented labor market theory suggests that the 
discrimination operates through institutional forces by assigning individuals of the 
discriminated groups to the secondary labor market at the beginning of their careers, 
and it is difficult for them to leave once they are placed in the secondary sector 
(Kalleberg and Sorensen 1979).  
Although the segmented labor market theory is developed in market 
economies, some researchers suggest that the theory may be used to analyze socialist 
economies where the distribution of labor force is managed by the administrative 
system instead of a free market (Bian 1994; Lin and Bian 1991; Stark 1986). In 
China’s context, it is obvious that the pre-reform economy is divided into rigorously 
segmented employment sectors by explicit institutional arrangements (e.g. Riskin, 
1987; Knight and Song, 1999). During the economic reform, some of the pre-reform 
institutions have been removed or reformed and some not. Nevertheless, the 
differences among employment sectors prevail in the reform era. Empirical studies 
have demonstrated that the state sector remained to be the primary sector in urban 
economy during the first decade of the economic reform (Bian 1994). The 
differentiations in returns to education and work experience between the 
state/collective sector and the private sector were recorded in a study in Zhongshan at 
the end of the second decade of the economic reform (Zang 2002). Evidence from a 
household survey in a northern county of China revealed that the marginal returns to 




To conclude, in China’s context, the employment sectors are the components 
of the segmented labor market, and the access to different employment sectors means 
different life opportunities for individual workers.  
The Market Transition Debate 
The market transition theory, first articulated by Victor Nee (1989, 1996), 
argues that the economic reform has changed the social structure in China through the 
emergence of the market economy because its institutional arrangement provides 
different structures of incentives and constraints from those of the state socialist 
economy. Under the state socialist economy, resources were controlled by the 
redistributive bureaucracy, and thus individuals who were close to the center of 
distribution had more power under such an institutional arrangement. On the contrary, 
the market economy promotes the power of competitive producers through the market 
exchange, and therefore creates new opportunities outside the redistributive system 
and entails the principles of resource allocation different from the state socialist 
economy. Consequently, in the sectors where the shift to market economy occurs, 
individuals who were excluded from advancement in the state socialist economy gain 
opportunities of upward mobility. Meanwhile, the relative advantage of those with the 
redistributive power is declining as the market sector expands.   
The market transition theory therefore predicts the shift of the importance of 
two sets of resources—political capital and human capital—in determining 
individuals' socioeconomic status in transitional China. Political capital, defined by 
the political and bureaucratic position, reflects an individual's closeness to the 




capital, usually measured by education and work experience, represents the human 
productivity, and therefore is important in the market economy. According to the 
market transition theory, as the market economy is growing in the reform era, returns 
to political capital decline and returns to human capital increase, compared to the pre-
reform era. Similarly, in regions where the market economy grows more rapidly, the 
decline of the importance of political capital and the increase of the importance of 
human capital in social stratification are more evident.   
However, the market transition theory has been widely criticized. The 
critiques of the market transition theory concentrate on the following aspects of the 
theory. First, the market transition theory ignores the fact that the market-oriented 
economic reform in China was initiated by the government and is still under the 
control of the government. Therefore, it is hard to disentangle state from market and 
treat them as totally independent institutions. Actually they are embedded within each 
other. On the one hand, the state's intervention in the market economy is everywhere. 
On the other hand, the state sector of the economy has been learning from the market 
economy to improve its own competency (Bian and Logan 1996; Zhou 2000b; 
Guthrie 1999). Secondly, the rewarding mechanisms of the redistributive economy 
and the market economy are not as antithetical as the market transition theory 
suggests (Róna-Tas 1994). The redistributive economy, even before the market-
oriented reform, also reward more to workers with better education and more work 
experience. In addition, since the launch of the economic reform, the Communist 
Party has been making investment in education for its current and potential members 




graduates from colleges (Zhou et al. 1996; Zhou 2000a). Thirdly, the market 
economy per se does not have inherent implications for inequality. Rather, the impact 
of the market economy on social stratification depends on the characteristics of the 
markets themselves. (Walder 2002)Therefore, to predict the impact of the shift to 
market allocation, it is necessary to take into account the institutional circumstances 
and the economic and political conditions (Walder 1996).  
The theoretical debate is accompanied by numerous empirical studies, and the 
mainstream approach is to compare the economic returns to political capital and 
human capital among individuals in different economic sectors that separately 
characterize the state socialist economy and the market economy. That is an 
appealing approach and has produced many interesting findings (for a review, see 
Bian 2002). However, those findings of the empirical studies on income inequality 
are mixed, and none of them can fully support any side of the market transition 
debate. In addition to examine the methodology used in the researches, some scholars 
have questioned the focus on income and income inequality to understand the social 
stratification in China (Oberschall 1996). One major problem of directly linking 
individuals’ income in different economic sectors to political capital and human 
capital is the ignorance on the act of agency while focusing on the outcomes of 
structural change (Róna-Tas 1994; Wu and Xie 2003). The assumption of the 
approach to study income inequality is that individuals' different positions in the 
structure (market versus redistribution) have given the different weights of human 
capital and political capital in each compartment of the structure and therefore 




can select or be selected into the market or the redistributive sector of the structure 
during the reform era. To shoot a more dynamic picture, there is a need to look at 
outcomes beyond income, such as the entries and shifts across the boundary of the 
components of the structure (Zhou et al. 1997). As I described in Chapter 2, the 
employment sector is one of the most important dimensions of the socioeconomic 
structure in contemporary China. Therefore, the examination on the job placement 
and job shift across employment sectors is necessary to understand the process of 
social stratification in the reform-era. In addition, since the employment sectors are of 
structural importance in Chinese economy and society, the procedure that assorts 
individual workers into different employment sectors also reflects the institutional 
change in the reform era.  
Furthermore, the participants of the market transition debate have mostly 
concentrated on the relative importance of the political capital and human capital in 
the procedure of social stratification. However, political capital was not the only 
mechanism of social stratification in pre-reform China. The class origin of the family, 
education, and gender were found to be significantly associated with occupational 
attainments in the state-socialist economy, although these effects were weakened for 
the cohort of “Cultural Revolution” due to the extreme destratification policies of the 
decade (Bian 2002; Whyte and Parish 1984). With the end of the “Cultural 
Revolution”, the effects of family, education, and gender have revived. Even under 
the market economy, the allocation of resources is not entirely governed by the 
market forces. Therefore, in addition to political capital and human capital, it is 




as family background and gender to gain a better understanding of the changing 
procedure of social stratification during the reform-era. 
Understanding Job Placement and Job Shift in Transitional China 
As an attempt to understand the impacts of the market-oriented economic 
reform on the process of social stratification in China, this dissertation examines the 
effects of education, family background, and gender on the entry into different 
employment sectors—the state/collective sector, the private sector, and the sector of 
family farming among young workers and the change of these effects as the economic 
reform proceeds. Moreover, the effects of education, family background, and gender 
on the job shifts across employment sectors among older workers are also examined. I 
develop a series of research hypotheses based on the previous theoretical and 
empirical researches on the influences of education, family background, and gender 
on labor market outcomes.   
Effects of Education 
Education is viewed as one of the most important factors of human capital, 
which determines the productivity of workers, by economists (e.g. Schultz 1971). To 
understand the relationship between education and the access to different employment 
sectors in China, the return to formal education in each employment sector should be 
taken into account. The market transition theory suggests that the sectors that are 
close to the market economy may value education more than the sectors that close to 
the state-socialist economy. If that is the case, better-educated workers will prefer to 




reward system of each employment sector finds that the differences in the economic 
returns to formal education among the employment sectors is more complicated than 
the market versus state dichotomy suggested by the market transition theory.  
First of all, the reward system of the state/collective sector in reform-era 
China also values education. Researches on the determinants of income in the 
state/collective sector find that educational achievement is positively associated with 
earnings (Peng 1992; Wu 2002; Zang 2002). In addition to economic returns, college-
educated workers have become significantly more likely to be recruited by the 
Communist Party during the reform era, and the party membership is an important 
political capital for career advancement in the state/collective sector (Walder 1995; 
Walder et al. 2000; Zhou et al. 1996; Zhou et al. 1997). In sum, better-educated 
workers are in an advantageous position in terms of gaining both economic and non-
economic rewards in the state/collective sector.  
Secondly, the mechanism determining the economic returns to education in 
the private sector is different from the private/state sector. Peng (1992) suggests that 
pay differentials between different education levels “are written into the remuneration 
system” (p. 208) in state-owned enterprises. However, the reward system in the 
private sector is mostly based on the workers’ performance. It is found that while a 
worker’s education level is positively associated with his or her wage in the 
state/collective sector, such a pattern cannot be found among workers without college 
education in the private sector. Therefore, it is likely that education is only rewarded 




words, education is directly rewarded in the state/collective sector, but indirectly 
rewarded through workers’ performance in the private sector.  
Thirdly, the private sector does not reward formal education universally. By 
making the distinction between workers who entered the private sector before and 
after 1987, Wu and Xie (2003) found that only those who entered the private sector 
after 1987 enjoyed significantly higher earnings than did those who had continuously 
worked in the state sector. Moreover, the earning advantage of working in the private 
sector is limited to those workers with high levels of education. The findings imply 
that the private sector does not have any inherent nature which leads to a higher 
returning to education.  
Lastly, the state policies have been guiding the economic reform in China and 
have strong impacts on the opportunity structure of each employment sector. The 
farming land contracted to farmers’ households is usually composed of scattered 
small plots of land due to the egalitarian approach of land allocation. Moreover, the 
costs of inputs for agricultural production have risen but the price of grain has not 
changed much since mid 1980s. Consequently, the agricultural production has been in 
stagnation (Khan and Riskin 2001). That means the sector of family farming cannot 
provide many opportunities for individuals working on the family farm. The 
opportunities in the private sector were limited in the 1980s because of the restriction 
on the size of the privately owned business. The legitimization of private ownership 
has stimulated the development of the private sector and created more lucrative 
opportunities in the private sector in the 1990s (Wu and Xie 2003). The 




outside the sector until the mid 1990s. The large-scale ownership reform of the 
state/collective sector in the mid 1990s leads to the close of many enterprises and the 
lay-off of large numbers of workers in the state/collective sector. As a result, the 
unique benefits of working in the state/collective sector such as lifetime employment 
and better welfares are disappearing.        
Therefore, the state/collective sector seems to have developed a systematic 
way to reward formal education. The distribution of earning and political capital (and 
hence career development) is closely associated with educational achievement. 
However, some advantages of working in the state/collective sector such as job 
security and better welfares are weakened during the ownership reform in the mid 
1990s. The rewarding system of the private sector is more likely to be performance-
based. Although better education will probably lead to better performance, the 
returning to formal education in the private sector is not guaranteed by wage policies. 
The expansion of the private sector in the 1990s appears to have benefited college-
educated workers more in the sector. The sector of family farming does not reward 
formal education much simply because the low level of earning potential in this 
sector. To conclude, the differentiation of the rewarding system to formal education 
among the employment sectors and the evolving reform policies might have 
influenced the procedure that matches workers with different education levels with 
different employment sectors. Based on the literature, I expect the following 
relationships between educational achievement and the access to different 




Hypothesis 1a: Among young workers, education levels are positively 
associated with the possibility of working in the state/collective sector and the 
private sector but negatively associated with the likelihood of working on the 
family farm.  
Hypothesis 1b: The association between education and employment sectors 
among young workers is changing in the course of economic reform. As a 
result of the growth of the private sector and the decline of the state/collective 
sector in the 1990s, the effect of education becomes stronger for entering into 
the private sector over time. At the same time, the effect of education declines 
for entering into the state/collective sector. The negative association between 
education and family farming remains stable over time.  
Hypothesis 1c: Among older workers, education levels are positively 
associated with the possibility of transferring to the state/collective sector or 
the private sector. On the contrary, education levels are negatively associated 
with the possibility of moving to family farming.  
Effects of Family Background 
The idea that family is a social unit in which its members share the similarity 
in their life chances can be found in the tradition of social stratification researches. In 
the literature of social stratification, family is regarded as the primary institution 
channeling social and economic inheritance and transmitting privilege from one 
generation to the next. Early studies on status attainment and intra- and 
intergenerational social mobility have found the effects of family of origin on 




While the early literature of social stratification views family of origin as the ascribed 
personal resource that influences status attainment (Lin 1999), the social capital 
theory emerged in recent decades provides a complementary perspective to further 
understand the family’s role in the process of social stratification. The social capital 
theory points out the importance of social resources (that is, resources accessed 
through social networks) in affecting the status attainment (Lin 2000). In addition, it 
is recognized that the social capital is not equally distributed among individuals, and 
the inequality of social capital is caused by the clustering of social actors (Lin 1999). 
Since family members share the social networks among themselves, families can 
affect the social stratification as the pool of social capital.        
The economic theory of the family considers the family as a unit of 
production and consumption and emphasizes the coordination among family 
members. According to the New Household Economics (Becker 1981), the division 
of labor among family members is an effort to maximize the joint welfare of the 
family. An individual’s decision regarding the allocation of time and effort to paid 
work in the labor market and unpaid work in the home is dependent on the activities 
and characteristics of other family members. Although it is debatable whether 
specialization or combination of the roles of caretaker and wage earners between 
husbands and wives is a more viable family strategy in contemporary society 
(Oppenheimer 1994), it is agreed that the decisions on work are made 
interdependently among family members.  
Both the social stratification researches and the economic theory suggest that 




Goldthorpe (Erickson and Goldthorpe 1992: 233) have summarized, on the one hand, 
due to the shared resources and constraints, family is “the unit of class ‘fate’”. On the 
other hand, the joint or interdependent decision-marking among family members on 
their labor market activities makes family “a key unit of strategic action pursued 
within the class structure”. In other words, the socioeconomic status of individuals 
may be affected by family background in two ways. First, family determines the 
original position of a person in the social stratification system and affects his or her 
prospect of social mobility through social capital and other shared resources. 
Secondly, a person’s achievement is affected by the family’s strategy in maximizing 
the well-being of the family as a whole.  
In China’s context, family background has always been a significant factor in 
affecting individuals’ employment sectors. Under the state-socialist economy, 
particular institutional arrangements implicitly gave family the strong influence in 
affecting the access to employment sectors for individuals. For instance, the rigid 
household registration system and the policy of limiting the nonagricultural jobs to 
urban residents contributed to the severe segmentation of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural employment sectors in pre-reform China. Since the household 
registration status is inherited from the family and can only be changed through a few 
limited channels (Wu and Treiman 2004), the access to nonagricultural employment 
sector was largely determined by their family background in household registration 
status. Another institution that gave families a significant role in determining 
individuals’ employment sectors in China is the “substitution” (dingti) system, which 




employees to designate one of their children as a successor in their work unit after 
their retirement (Davis 1990). Although the household registration status becomes 
less important on the labor markets in recent years and the substitution system and the 
rationing system were eliminated in 1986, such institutions have undoubtedly 
reinforced family obligations and solidarity in China. Their impact may outlive the 
institutions themselves.  
More importantly, according to the theory of social capital and its influence 
on status attainment in general and on labor market outcomes in particular (Lin 2000; 
Lin 1999; Granovetter 2005), family can directly determine an individual's 
employment sector because all family members form a social network among 
themselves. Although Granovetter (1973) found that such kind of “strong ties” is not 
the most important part of the social network that helps people find a job in the 
United States, family does serve an important channel for locating jobs in urban 
China in the late 1980s (Bian 1997) and in the 1990s (Zang 2003). Using the 1991 
CHNS data, Michelson and Parish (2000) found that having other white-collar 
workers in the household increases one’s chances of having a state or collective off-
farm job in rural areas. In addition, the solidarity and trust of the family and kinship 
networks are found to have positive effects on the number and size of private rural 
enterprises (Peng 2004). Hence, it is very likely that the individuals’ access to 
different employment sectors in China is determined by their family’s possession of 
social capital in each employment sector.  
Meanwhile, the reform has revived the economic role of Chinese families and 




rural areas, the establishment of the household responsibility system in agricultural 
production after the economic reform has explicitly made farmers’ households the 
unit of production (Davis and Harrell 1993; Entwisle et al. 2000; Whyte 1996). In 
addition, the removal of restrictions on private enterprise has encouraged the 
development of family business in nonagricultural production (Entwisle et al. 1995; 
Whyte 1996). Although the majority of urban families are not involved in family 
business (Whyte 1996), the reduced constraints on job mobility and the expansion of 
the private sector have created opportunities for urban families to coordinate the 
employment sectors among family members.  
Previous studies suggest that risk aversion may be the strategy taken by 
Chinese families to coordinate the employment sectors among family members in the 
reform era. For farmers’ households, in spite of the significant income gap between 
farming and off-farm jobs, they may employ the “safety-first” strategy to ensure that 
they have adequate food due to the fear of hunger and famine (Scott 1976; Keister 
and Nee 2000). On the other hand, wage work and entrepreneurship will significantly 
improve the income of farmers’ households (Cook 2000). Consequently, the farmers’ 
households may want to balance the risks and gains of different employment sectors 
by keeping some family members on the land and sending others to the off-farm jobs. 
Urban families face a similar situation. While the state/collective sector traditionally 
provides better job security than the private sector does, the wage rate is higher in the 
private sector than in the state/collective sector. Therefore, urban families may also 
feel the need to diversify the employment sectors of family members. In sum, facing 




by the economic transition in the reform era in China, there may be a strong concern 
on diverting the risks and taking jobs in different employment sectors for Chinese 
families (Entwisle et al. 2000). 
Has the influence of family background on individuals’ employment sectors 
changed in the course of the economic reform? The market transition theory provides 
theoretical grounds for the answer. Although the theory does not explicitly discuss the 
change of the relative significance of family background in the job findings as the 
reform proceeds, it is implied that a full-fledged labor market will diminish the 
influence of family connections on individuals’ job placement (Guthrie 1998; Guthrie 
2002). Moreover, the institutional constraints on job mobility under the state socialist 
economy will decline as the labor market further develops. A study on the hiring 
channels in the transitional labor market in Russia suggests that the transition from 
state socialist to market economy leads to the substitution of strong ties with weak 
ties as the social network that facilitates job seeking in the labor market (Yakubovich 
and Kozina 2000). Meanwhile, the necessity to diversify employment sectors among 
family members may decrease because the segmentations of the state/collective 
sector, the private sector, and the family farming might diminish as the market 
economy expands.  
To sum it up, the general theories on family in sociology and economics have 
pointed out the important role of family in social stratification. The studies in China 
suggest that the family background may influence the individuals’ access to the 
employment sectors through the social capital effect of the family or the family 




the relative importance of the family in accessing different employment sectors. 
Based on the literature, I develop two competitive research hypotheses (Hypthesis 2a 
and Hypothesis 2b) on the overall effects of family background on individuals’ 
employment sectors and one hypothesis (Hypothesis 2c) on the change of the effects 
over time.  
Hypothesis 2a: If the family background works as the social capital in 
determining the individuals’ access to employment sector, the relationship 
between the respondent’s employment sector and other family members’ 
employment sector is positive. Specifically, the chance for young workers to 
enter a certain employment sector will increase when their families already 
have another member working in that sector. Similarly, the chances for older 
workers to move to a certain employment sector at Time 2 will increase when 
they have other family members in that sector at Time 1.  
Hypothesis 2b: If the family strategy to diversify risks is working, an 
individual’s employment sector is negatively associated with other family 
members’ employment sector. In specific, the possibility for young workers to 
work in a certain employment sector will decrease if their families already 
have other members working in that sector. Likewise, the possibility for older 
workers to transfer to a certain employment sector at Time 2 will decrease if 
their families already have other members working in that sector at Time 1.   
Hypothesis 2c: No matter it is the social capital effect or the risk 




employment sectors and other members’ employment sector in their families 
will decline over time as the market-oriented reform proceeds.  
Effects of Gender 
The neo-classical economics applies the supply-demand framework to analyze 
the gender inequality in labor market outcomes (Anker 1997). On the supply side, it is 
argued that women’s lower levels of human capital (i.e. less education and less work 
experience) leads to their lower productivity in the labor markets. As a result, women 
receive lower pay than men. Due to the gender wage gap in the labor markets, the 
opportunity cost of not working is low for women and high for men. To maximize the 
utility of the family, the division of labor between men and women—men focusing on 
work outside home and women concentrating on domestic work—is the rational 
choice of the family (Becker 1981). Moreover, even if women work outside home, 
they prefer occupations with relatively high starting pay, relatively low returns to 
experience, and relatively low penalties for temporary withdrawal from the labor 
force to accommodate their responsibility for housework and childcare. On the labor 
demand side, the productivity-related factors also influence employers’ preference for 
male over female workers. Jobs requiring a relatively high level of education and 
experience are more likely to be offered to men than to women. Furthermore, women 
are often felt to be higher-cost workers because of their needs of maternity leave, 
child care, and flexible work schedules in order to care for family responsibilities.   
Feminist scholars have challenged the neo-classical model by pointing out that 
the factors determining the supply and the demand of female labor are embedded in 




gender neutral. In the neo-classical model, family is assumed to be an egalitarian 
collectivity in which altruism is the principle of allocating resources between family 
members. Feminist theories argue that there are inequalities between men, women, 
and children in the distribution of materials and decision-making power within the 
family (Bruce 1986; Folbre 1986; Kabeer 1994). In other words, conflicts of interests 
exist in both intergenerational relationships and marital partnerships. This argument 
has important implications for understanding the gender inequality in the supply of 
labor in the labor markets. Girls can be greatly disadvantaged in human capital 
development by parents’ decision of not investing in their education or only investing 
in certain types or levels of education which has limited earning potential in the long 
run (Brinton 1993; Greenhalgh 1985). Moreover, the tension between women’s 
choice of working on paid jobs outside home and staying at home to take care of the 
child and other household chores is essentially the conflicts between men’s and 
women’s interests (Presser 1995). In addition to the gender inequality in the home, 
the policies of social and economic development have strong effects on the supply of 
female labor as well. For example, it is observed that the lack of access to 
infrastructure in rural South India impedes women's ability to participate in market 
activities (Desai and Jain 1994).  
On the demand side, the industrial structure and the organization of work of 
an economy are found to have strong influence on the work opportunities for women. 
The rapid development of the service sector is believed to be one of the factors that 
led to the rise of women’s labor force participation in industrial societies, although its 




and Scott 1978). A comparative study of the labor force participation of married 
women in Taiwan and South Korea suggests that there is a higher demand for female 
workers in Taiwan where work is mainly organized in small, labor-intensive firms 
than in South Korea where work is largely organized in large, capital-intensive firms 
(Brinton et al. 1995). Moreover, the institutionalized discriminations against women 
in the labor market constrict the demand for female labors. The removal of such 
institutions (e.g. the "marriage bar" in hiring women workers) will greatly increased 
women's work opportunities outside the home (Goldin 1990).     
There is no doubt that the gender inequality in the labor market outcomes 
involves many objective and subjective factors at micro and macro levels. The 
market-oriented economic reform in China has explicitly affected the demand for 
female workers through the change of economic structures. On the one hand, the 
rapid growth of the tertiary industry during the reform era should have created many 
work opportunities for women. National statistics show that the tertiary industry 
accounted for 12.6 percent of total employment in China in 1979. The percentage 
increased to 18.3 percent in 1989 and 26.4 percent in 1997. At the same time, the 
growth of the secondary industry is much slower. In 1979, 17.6 percent of workers 
were in the secondary industry and the percentage grew to 23.7 percent in 1997 (State 
Statistical Bureau, P.R.C. 2002). It is documented that young women hold an average 
of 70 to 80 percent of the jobs in the factories in export-processing zones 
(Summerfield 1994). On the other hand, women workers suffer disproportionately 
from the decline of the state/collective sector since the mid 1990s. A recent study on 




likely to be laid off from state-owned and collective enterprises even after controlling 
the workers’ and the firms’ characteristics (Xie 2004).  
Moreover, the discrimination against women in the labor markets might have 
increased during the reform era because the employers in the state/collective sector 
are given more autonomy in labor management and the private sector is not under the 
government regulations at all. There is some evidence indicating that this has 
occurred. Women are perceived to be less reliable, less efficient, and more expensive 
workers in the state/collective sector (Honig and Hershatter 1988) and enterprises 
start to be reluctant to hire women after the economic reform due to the pressure of 
improving their financial performance (Bauer et al. 1992). In addition, a substantial 
gender wage gap has been recorded in all employment sectors, including the state 
sector and urban collective sector (Bian et al. 2000), the rural township and village 
enterprises (Dong et al. 2004), and the private sector (Liu et al. 2000; Maurer-Fazio 
and Hughes 2002; Summerfield 1994). However, if the low wage does not hold 
women back from joining the labor force, the wage discrimination against women 
might increase the demand for female labor because women provide labor at less cost.  
On the supply side, previous researches have argued that the gender inequality 
in families has strong impact on rural women’s participation in off-farm work 
opportunities. Using the 1989 CHNS data, it is found that, relative to men, rural 
women are less likely to work in the nonagricultural business run by families and 
more likely to work exclusively on agricultural production (Entwisle et al. 1995). It is 
speculated that in farmers’ households men are always assigned to “economically 




economically important work may change with changes in the larger economic 
context, the boundary between “men’s work” and “women’s work” is not fixed 
(Entwisle and Henderson 2000). In addition, a few studies found that marital status 
has different influences on men’s and women’s off-farm employment status. In rural 
Guangdong, while marriage has little effect on men’s wage-employment status, the 
probability of wage-employment for married women is 67 percent lower than for 
single women (Hare 1999). The disadvantage of married women in participating 
nonagricultural work outside home is also found in other rural areas in China (Jacka 
1997; Matthews and Nee 2000).  
In sum, multiple and sometimes contradicting forces have been working 
together to affect men’s and women’s access to different employment sectors in the 
reform era in China. It seems that the state/collective sector is becoming less 
accessible to women than to men, especially after the mid 1990s when the massive 
downsizing of the state/collective sector started. Moreover, since the state/collective 
sector is still under the government regulation, the cost of providing maternity leave 
and other welfares to female workers makes women less preferable for the employers 
of the state/collective sector. As for the access to the private sector, the literature 
suggests that the expansion of the tertiary sector and the substantial gender wage gap 
might work in favor of young women over young men in entering into the private 
sector because young women might be considered to be “suitable” to the jobs and 
they are less expensive. However, the discrimination against women in the private 
sector might hurt women later due to the sector’s preference of younger women over 




indicates that women have a larger probability to work on the family farm than men 
do. The effect might become weaker for young workers as the economy continues to 
grow. But among individuals who already worked on the farm, off-farm jobs might 
be more accessible to men than to women due to the gendered household division of 
labor in farmers’ households. Therefore, I have the following hypotheses on the 
gender difference in the job placement and job shift across employment sectors.  
Hypothesis 3a: Relative to young males, young females are less likely to work 
in the state/collective sector but more likely to work in the private/other sector 
and on the family farm.  
Hypothesis 3b: Among the young workers, men’s advantage on entering into 
the state/collective sector and women’s advantage on entering into the private 
sector becomes even larger as the market economy expands. Nevertheless, the 
gender difference in the probability of working on the family farm declines 
over time due to the growth of off-farm job opportunities for young workers.  
Hypothesis 3c: Among older workers, women are less likely to transfer to the 
state/collective sector or the private sector than men are. On the contrary, 
women are more likely to leave the state/collective sector or the private sector 






Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
In this chapter I will first introduce the data used for the research. Then the 
characteristics of the analytical samples are discussed, which is followed by the 
description of the definitions and measures of the variables in the analysis. Lastly, the 
methods utilized to undertake the statistical analysis are presented.  
Data 
The data for my study come from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS), a longitudinal household study conducted in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 
and 2004. The survey is sponsored by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
and the Institute of Nutrition and Food Hygiene of the Chinese Academy of 
Preventive Medicine. The main goals of the survey are to inspect how the social and 
economic transformation of Chinese society affects the health and nutritional status of 
its population, but the survey collected rich information on household members aged 
16 and above, including details of their employment. Therefore, the data can be used 
to examine the employment sectors of individuals over time. In addition, the richness 
of the information for each household of the survey, especially the demographic 
composition, household income, and the family background in terms of family 
members’ employment sectors, are highly suitable for my goal of exploring the 
impact of family on individual’s labor market.  
The CHNS covered the households selected from eight provinces— Liaoning, 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and Guangxi—in the first three 




Heilongjiang since the fourth wave (1997). These provinces were not selected 
according to a probability design but were intentionally selected to represent 
geographic diversity of China and are from northeastern, coastal, central, and 
southwestern regions of China (Figure 4.1). Furthermore, these provinces are 
different in terms of their socioeconomic development and their exposure to the 
market transformation. From Figure 4.2, it is clear that the coastal provinces (Jiangsu 
and Shandong) and provinces in the Northeast (Liaoning and Heilongjiang) have 
higher level of economic development, which is measured by GDP per capita. The 
three provinces in the center of China (Henan, Hubei, and Hunan) show a near-
average level of economic development. The GDP per capita of the Western 
provinces (Guizhou and Guangxi) are substantially lower than the average level of the 
country.  
Within each province, a multistage, random cluster process was used to draw 
the survey sample. Counties in the provinces were stratified by income and a 
weighted sampling scheme was used to randomly select four counties in each 
province. In addition, the provincial capital city and a lower income city were 
selected. Within the counties, in addition to the county town, three villages were 
randomly selected. For the cities, two urban and two suburban neighborhoods within 
the cities were selected randomly. Within each village or neighborhood, 20 
households were randomly selected.  
During the second and third wave of the survey (1991 and 1993), CHNS 
strictly sticks to the originally surveyed households from the first wave (1989), and 




newly formed households that grow out of the original households and locate in the 
original site. However, in the fourth wave of the survey (1997), in addition to the 
substitution of Liaoning Province with Heilongjiang Province, new survey sites in the 
other survey provinces are introduced to replace the sites that cannot continue the 
survey for some reason. In addition, if there are fewer than 20 households in the 
continuously surveyed sites, new households are added to make up 20 households for 
each site. As a consequence of the replacement strategy used in 1997, 16.6% of the 
individuals (2,384 out of 14,399) are from the newly joined survey sites, and 9.6% 
(1,385 out of 14,399) are from the newly joined households in the re-visited survey 
sites. In total, 26.2% of the individuals in the 1997 CHNS are fresh to the survey.  
Due to the design of the survey, the CHNS data are not nationally 
representative, but do represent the surveyed population, which accounted for roughly 
a third of China's population.  
Sample 
This research uses the first (1989) and the fourth (1997) wave of CHNS to 
construct two analytical samples. One set of analyses focuses on the combined cross-
sectional sample of the youth (aged 17 to 24) from the two survey waves. The second 
concentrates on the panel sample of adult workers who aged 25 to 44 in 1989 and 
worked in 1997 as well.  
The cross-sectional sample is composed of individuals between ages 17 to 24 
in 1989 and in 1997 separately. Due to the 8-year gap between the two waves of the 
survey, there is no overlap of the individuals in both years. The purpose of this 




jobs in different employment sectors. Considering that a large proportion of this age 
group may have not joined the labor force due to schooling or prolonged transition 
from schooling to employment, the youths who were working at the time of the 
survey are indeed a selected group. A way to deal with the selectivity problem is to 
treat not-in-the-labor-force as a parallel outcome to working-in-different-
employment-sectors. Hence, the cross-sectional sample of the youth includes all the 
individuals in the age group, regardless of their employment status. The total number 
of youths in the sample is 4,156, with 2,388 from year 1989 and 1,768 from year 
1997.  
The panel sample of the adult workers includes employed individuals who 
were between ages 25 to 44 in 1989 and were in the labor force in 1997. The purpose 
of the sample is to investigate the determinants of job shifts across employment 
sectors. Since the CHNS does not collect the information on the employment history 
of respondents, it is likely that some of the workers in the panel sample may leave the 
labor force or change their employment sectors between waves. Therefore, the overall 
rate of job mobility across employment sectors might be underestimated in this study. 
Additionally, it should be noted that not all respondents in the first wave of the survey 
were still around in the fourth wave of the survey. Table 4.1 presents the distribution 
of the lost cases for various reasons. Among the initial 15,917 observations of the first 
wave, 9,107 (57%) stayed in the survey during the fourth wave. Of the lost cases, 
37.2 percent can be attributed to the replacement of the survey sites (including the 
replacement of provinces and communities), 22.4 percent are the households that 




individuals who are not available anymore in the revisited households. For the 
analytical sample, there are 4,411 workers aged 25 to 44 in the first wave of CHNS, 
and 2,833 (64%) of them are tracked down in the fourth wave.1 Among the 1,578 lost 
observations, more than half (53.1%) are from the province and communities that are 
replaced in 1997, 26.4 (n = 416) percent are individuals of the households that are 
replaced in 1997, and 20.5 (n = 323) percent are individuals who could not be found 
in the resurveyed households. According to the design of CHNS, the household 
members who have moved out of the original household of the first wave but stayed 
in the same community are tracked down. Considering the low mortality rate of this 
age group (25-44), it is very likely that the 416 households and 323 individuals who 
could not be found in the re-interviewed sites have moved out of their original 
communities.  
Further analysis shows that the workers who had left the survey (leavers) are 
very different from those stayed in the survey (stayers) with regard to their 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Table 4.2 lists the distributions of 
age, education, gender, marital status, employment sector, residence, and family’s 
background in each employment sector in 1989 for the stayers and leavers. 
Considering the multiple reasons of losing cases from 1989 to 1997, the leavers are 
divided to three subgroups: those who left the survey because the whole survey site 
was replaced, those who left the survey because the whole household could not be 
found, and those who left the survey because the individuals could not be found. The 
characteristics of all leavers are also presented in the table. In general, the leavers 
were younger: 35.4 percent of them were between ages 25 and 29, and only 23.4 
                                                 




percent of the stayers were at that age range. The leavers were better educated: 32.4 
percent of them had at least some high school education, and only 21 percent of the 
stayers had the same level of education. The proportion of male workers is slightly 
higher among the leavers (53.8%) than among the stayers (51.4%). While 96.8 
percent of the stayers were married, only 89.6 percent of the leavers were married. 
The leavers were mostly working for the state/collective sector in 1989 (62.9%). In 
contrast, stayers were concentrated on family farming (58.4%). About 59.2 percent of 
the stayers were rural residents from villages, and only 34.9 percent of the leavers 
lived in villages. The leavers were more likely to have some family background in the 
state/collective sector than the stayers: 64.5 percent of the leavers were from families 
with other family member in the state/collective sector, and only 38.0 percent of the 
stayers were from the same family background. On the contrary, while only 30.5 
percent of the leavers were from farmer’s family, the percentage for the stayers 
almost doubled (58.9%). Although there are some variations on those features among 
the leavers, but the observed general differences between leavers and stayers still hold 
for each subgroup of the leavers. In short, relative to the stayers, leavers tended to be 
younger, better educated, male, single, employed by the state/collective sector, living 
in the cities and towns, and from families with other member working in the 
state/collective sector. This means that the panel sample of adult workers has some 
bias, and we need to be cautious when interpreting the results from the analyses of the 





Three sets of dependent variables are derived from the record of employment 
sector of the respondents’ primary job in CHNS. The first one is about the primary 
employment sectors of young respondents aged 17 to 24. CHNS asked the 
respondents about the "type of work unit" of their primary job. Based on the answer 
to that question, a respondent’s employment sector is grouped into: (1) state and 
collective sector, (2) private and other sector, and (3) family contract farming.2  In 
addition to the three employment sectors, two other categories—(4) not working, and 
(5) still in school—are also created to capture those who were not active on the job 
market at the time of the survey.3 Employment in the state and collective sector 
includes working in the state enterprises and institutes, large collective enterprises 
owned by county, city, and province, and small collective enterprises owned by 
township and district. Individuals working in the enterprises and institutes that are 
owned by individuals (including the respondents themselves), foreign investors or 
other private parties are categorized as employment in the private and other sector. 
Individuals who work on the land contracted to the family by government are 
categorized as working for family contract farming.  
Based on the three categories of the employment sectors—state/collective 
sector, private/other sector, and family contract farming, the other two sets of 
                                                 
2 In 1989, however, there is no separate category of "family contract farming" in the answers to the 
question of the type of work unit. Therefore, the category is constructed from the information of the 
respondent's primary occupation and type of work unit. If the respondent's primary job is "farmer" and 
the type of the work unit is "private, individual" or "other", the respondent is assumed to work on thee 
family farm.   
3 For those who were not on the labor market between ages 17 to 24 at the time of survey, 58% were 
still in school and 42% were not working. Considering the overall high labor force participation rate in 
China (about 90% for men and 80% for women between ages 16 to 64 according to the statistics by the 




dependent variables are about the job shifts across employment sectors among adult 
workers (age 25 to 44) over time. The first is a dichotomous variable about whether a 
change of employment sector has happened between 1989 and 1997. When a 
respondent’s employment sector of 1997 is different from 1989, the variable is coded 
as “1”; otherwise, it is “0”. A second set of the outcomes of job shifts across 
employment sectors is limited to individuals who have changed their employment 
sectors. It specifies the destination of the change. Corresponding to the three 
categories of employment sectors, there are three possible destinations of the change 
of employment sectors: (1) moving into the state and collective sector, (2) moving 
into the private and other sector, and (3) moving into the family contract farming. 
Accordingly, three dichotomous variables are created for the destinations of job shifts 
across employment sectors.  
The percentage distribution of occupation, education and residence by 
employment sectors for all the workers (including both young and older workers) in 
1989 and 1997 (Table 4.3) shows that there are some differences in the composition 
of each employment sector in terms of workers’ characteristics. For instance, the 
state/collective sector has a larger proportion of professionals, administrators or 
managers, office staff, skilled workers, and unskilled workers than the private/other 
sector. However, the private/other sector has a much larger proportion of service 
workers than the state/collective sector. The discrepancy might reflect the fast 
development of tertiary industry in the private/other sector. In addition, high school 
and college education are more common in the state/collective sector than in the other 




geographic distribution, which should not be a surprise considering that the state and 
collective sectors were concentrating in the urban areas in the pre-reform era.  
Independent Variables 
Human capital is measured by educational achievement. CHNS collected 
information on the respondent’s total years of formal education completed in all kinds 
of regular schools. Four levels of education are extracted from that variable: (1) no 
schooling, (2) primary school, (3) middle school, and (4) high school and above, 
including vocational school, technical school and college.4   
The family’s presence or absence in the employment sectors is captured by 
aggregating the employment sectors of family members, excluding the respondent’s 
own employment sector. Specifically, if there is at least one family member other 
than the respondent were working in an employment sector, the family is considered 
as being involved in that sector. Given the three categories of employment sectors, 
three dichotomous variables are created: (1) having other family member in the 
state/collective sector, (2) having other family member in the private/other sector, and 
(3) having other family member in family contract farming. Gender is a dichotomous 
variable. Female is coded as “1”, and male as “0”.  
All the three variables above are applied to both the cross-sectional and the 
panel analysis. An additional variable is created for the cross-sectional sample of 
youth, which is the period effect, measured by the variable of survey year. Year 1997 
                                                 
4 Ideally, “college education and above” should be grouped into a separated category.  However, on 
average, only 3.5% of the labor force had college education in 1997 (State Statistic Bureau, 1998), and 
the proportion was even lower in 1989. Accordingly, a small number of observations in the CHNS 
have college education (N = 412 for the sample of youth, and N = 119 for the sample of older 
workers), which makes it difficult to have the college education as a separated category in the 




is referred as “1”, and year 1989 as “0”. Furthermore, the interactive terms between 
year and education, the composition of other family members’ employment sector, 
and gender are created to analyze the change of the impacts of human capital, family, 
and gender over time.  
Control Variables 
In the multivariate analysis, in addition to the independent variables listed 
above, I control for age, marital status, demographic composition of the family, total 
family income, residence, and province, which are the factors that could have some 
influence on the employment sector of Chinese workers according to the literature.    
For the cross-sectional sample of youth, two age groups are created: (1) under 
age 20, and (2) age 20 to 24. For the panel sample of adult workers, three age groups 
are created: (1) under age 30, (2) age 30 to 39, and (3) age 40 to 44. Marital status has 
two categories: (1) currently married, and (2) not currently married, including never 
married, divorced, separated, or widowed.  
The demographic composition of the family is measured by three variables. 
The first is a dichotomy of whether the family had any preschool child (under age 7) 
in the household. The second variable is also dichotomous, which is about whether 
there is any old family member (age 60 and above) living in the household. The third 
variable reflects the number of working age member (age 20 to 49) in the family. If 
the respondent is at that age range (which is true for most cases in the analytical 
samples), he or she is excluded from the head count. The total number of working age 




family member, (2) with one additional working age member, and (3) with two or 
more additional working age members.  
The total annual income of the family is a constructed variable provided by 
CHNS. To gain a better hold of the nonlinear effect of family income on individual’s 
employment sector, the continuous annual family income is divided into the 
following five groups: (1) under 1,000 yuan, (2) 1,000 to 2,999 yuan, (3) 3,000 to 
4,999 yuan, (4) 5,000 to 6,999 yuan, and (5) 7,000 yuan and above.  
In CHNS, the residence of the respondents is grouped into city, suburb, town, 
and village. The four categories can be understood by a hypothetical scale of 
urbanization: cities are on the highest end of urbanization, villages on the lowest end, 
and suburbs and towns in between. The major difference between suburbs and towns 
is the closeness to cities. Suburbs are always the outskirts of cities, but a town is the 
administrative center of a rural area, and can be far away from cities. To keep the 
nuances of the different residences, I use the four categories of residence to control its 
effect.  
The eight provinces in the survey are gathered into four groups: (1) 
Northeastern provinces, including Liaoning and Heilongjiang; (2) Coastal provinces, 
including Shandong and Jiangsu; (3) Central provinces, including Henan, Hubei, and 
Hunan; and (4) Western provinces, including Guizhou and Guangxi.   
In addition, for the analysis on the job shifts across employment sectors 
among adult workers, their baseline employment sectors in 1989 are controlled. The 
control is necessary because, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, there are great 




the cost and benefit of changing the employment sector are partially determined by 
the respondent’s original employment sector, which in turn affect the decision of 
changing jobs across employment sectors.   
Analytical Strategies 
I use multinomial logit models to investigate the factors affecting the 
attainment of jobs in different employment sectors among the youths. The 
Multinomial logit model is chosen because there are five mutually exclusive 
categorical outcomes of employment for the youths: in school, out of school but not 
working, working in the state/collective sector, working in the private/other sector, 
and working on the family farm. A series of nested models are developed. The 
baseline model includes the key independent variables (education, family’s presence 
in the employment sectors, gender, and year) and all the control variables but family 
income.5 The equation is as follows:  
(0) log(Pij/Pi1) = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B5Year + ΣBkXk + ri    
where: Pij = probability of falling into outcome category j for individual i (j = 2 to 5) 
Pi1 = probability of falling into outcome category 1 for individual i 
E = education  
G = gender  
S = other family member in the state/collective sector  
P = other family member in the private/other sector 
F = other family member in family farming 
Year = CHNS survey year 
                                                 
5 Due to the strong collinearity between family income and the composition of family members’ 




Xk = control variables (family income excluded) 
Then the models with the interactive terms between the variable of year and 
each key independent variable are estimated separately. That is, there are five models 
with interactive terms: (1) with the interaction between year and education, (2) with 
the interaction between interaction between year and family’s presence in the 
state/collective sector, (3) with the interaction between year and family’s presence in 
the private/other sector, (4) with the interaction between year and family’s presence 
in farming, and (5) with the interaction between year and gender. The equations of 
those models are: 
(1) log(Pij/Pi1) = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B5Year + B6Year*E + ΣBkXk 
+ ri    
(2) log(Pij/Pi1) = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B5Year + B6Year*S + ΣBkXk 
+ ri    
(3) log(Pij/Pi1) = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B5Year + B6Year*P + ΣBkXk 
+ ri    
(4) log(Pij/Pi1) = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B5Year + B6Year*F + ΣBkXk 
+ ri    
(5) log(Pij/Pi1) = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B5Year + B6Year*G + 
ΣBkXk+ ri    
where: Year*E = interactive term of year and education 





Year*P = interactive term of year and having family member in the 
private/other sector 
Year*F = interactive term of year and having family member in family 
farming 
Year*G = interactive term of year and gender 
The baseline model estimates the overall effects of the key independent 
variables on the entry of an employment for the youth. The models with interactions 
further analyze the period effects of the key independent variables and examine the 
extent of the change of their effects over time, if there is any. The predicated 
probabilities of the independent variables are calculated to facilitate the understanding 
of the results of the multinomial models.  
Since the outcomes of the job shifts across employment sectors are 
dichotomous, I use logit models to explore the determinants of such job shifts among 
the adult workers. As I mentioned earlier, there are four outcomes to be examined: (1) 
changed employment sector or not, (2) moved to the state/collective sector or the 
other two sectors, (3) moved to the private/other sector or the other two sectors, and 
(4) moved to family farming or the other two sectors. In accordance, four logit 
models are estimated. The second to the fourth outcome only applies to those who 
have changed their employment sectors. In each model, the independent and control 
variables always take their values in 1989 in order to establish a solid casual 
relationship between the independent variables and the outcomes, which must have 
taken place after 1989. The equation of each model is as follows:  




(2) log[Pmovetostate/(1-Pmovetostate)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + ΣBkXk+ ri    
(3) log[Pmovetoprivate/(1-Pmovetoprivate)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + ΣBkXk+ ri    
(4) log[Pmovetofarm/(1-Pmovetofarm)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + ΣBkXk+ ri    
where: Pchange = probability of having changed the employment sector 
 Pmovetostate = probability of having moved to the state/collective sector 
 Pmovetoprivate = probability of having moved to the private/other sector 
 Pmovetofarm = probability of having moved to farming 
In order to test the research hypotheses on the differentiated gender effects by 
marital status and employment sectors, the interactive terms between gender and 
marital status and between gender and original employ sector are later added in each 
model. As a result, eight models are estimated:  
(1a) log[Pchange/(1-Pchange)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B5F + B6G*M + 
ΣBkXk+ ri    
(2a) log[Pmovetostate/(1-Pmovetostate)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B6G*M + 
ΣBkXk+ ri    
(3a) log[Pmovetoprivate/(1-Pmovetoprivate)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B6G*M 
+ ΣBkXk+ ri    
(4a) log[Pmovetofarm/(1-Pmovetofarm)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + + B6G*M 
ΣBkXk+ ri    
 (1b) log[Pchange/(1-Pchange)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B6G*OES + 
ΣBkXk+ ri    
(2b) log[Pmovetostate/(1-Pmovetostate)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B6G*OES 




(3b) log[Pmovetoprivate/(1-Pmovetoprivate)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + 
B6G*OES + ΣBkXk+ ri    
(4b) log[Pmovetofarm/(1-Pmovetofarm)] = B0 + B1E + B2G + B3S + B4P + B5F + B6G*OES 
+ ΣBkXk+ ri    
Where: G*M = interactive term of gender and marital status 
G*OES = interactive term of gender and original employment sector 
The predicted probabilities based on the models are used to better interpret the 
interactive effects.  
Due to the method of clustered sampling used by CHNS, there is a legitimate 
concern on the interdependence of the observations. Individuals who came from the 
same community, county, city, or even province may share some characteristics, so 
they are not truly independent from each other. Most importantly, since the survey 
collected employment data on each family member aged 16 and over, it is possible 
that two or more individuals from the same household are included in the same 
analytic sample. Therefore, when estimating the models for the cross-sectional and 
the panel sample, the standard errors are always adjusted by using the “cluster” option 




Chapter 5: Where to Start? Job Placements across Employment 
Sectors among Young Workers 
 
Which employment sector would a Chinese worker choose when he or she 
first entered the unique labor market stratified by employment sectors? Using 
multinomial logistic regression models, this chapter examines the factors affecting the 
choices of employment sectors among young workers (age 17 to 24). As I mentioned 
in Chapter 4, it is necessary to include the categories of ‘not working yet’ to control 
the selectivity problem of young workers. Therefore, there are five categories for the 
dependent variable in the multinomial models: (1) not working and not in school, (2) 
in school, (3) state/collective sector, (4) private/other sector, and (5) family contract 
farming. Although it will be interesting to inspect the differences between each pair 
of the categories, the focus of this research is the labor market behavior and thus the 
discussion in this chapter will concentrate on the comparison across the three 
employment sectors. The comparisons between the youths who were working and 
who were not working are only discussed when it is necessary to substantiate a 
theoretical point. In accordance, five pairs of outcomes are displayed for the results 
from the multinomial model: not working versus farming, in school versus farming, 
state/collective sector versus farming, private/other sector versus farming, and 
private/other sector versus state/collective sector.1 Among the influencing factors, I 
will focus on the effects of year, human capital, family background, and gender. In 
addition, the interactive effects of year and the other key independent variables  will 
                                                 
1 There are four pairs of outcomes from the multinomial analysis that are not shown here. They are: not 
working versus state/collective sector, not working versus private/other sector, in school versus 




be discussed to understand the period effects of those variables as the market 
economy expands. Since the coefficients for multinomial models are in relative terms, 
the predicted probabilities of the five outcomes of youths’ employment status are 
calculated for the subgroups defined by the key independent variables separately to 
present clearer pictures on the effects of the independent variables.2  
Effects of Year 
Table 5.1 displays the distribution of five outcome categories for the youths 
all together and by survey year separately. On average, in the 1990s, about 40 percent 
of the youths aged 17 to 24 worked on the family farm, 26 percent in the 
state/collective sector, and only 10.8 percent in the private/other sector. The rest were 
not working at the time of the survey. It is obvious that there are many more youths 
working in the private/other sector in 1997 (17.9%) than in 1989 (6.0%). At the same 
time, the proportions of the youths in the state/collective sector and in family farming 
have greatly declined over time. In 1989, 31.2 percent of the youths were working for 
the state/collective sector. In 1997, the percentage went down to 19.6 percent. The 
proportion of young farmers has decreased from 44.5 percent in 1989 to 34.7 percent 
in 1997.  
The multivariate estimates in Table 5.2 also demonstrate the growth of the 
private/other sector. The positive and significant coefficients of “Year 1997” for 
“private/other sector versus farming” and “private/other sector versus state/collective 
sector” suggest that, compared to 1989, the probability of working in the private/other 
                                                 
2 The predicted probability is calculated by using the “prvalue” procedure in STATA provided by Long 
and Xu (www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/spost.htm). When calculating the predicted probabilities, the value 
of the key independent variable specifies the subgroup and the rest of the independent variables are set 




sector for the youths has significantly increased in 1997 relative to the likelihood of 
working on the farming farm or in the state/collective sector. In order to examine the 
trends of the distribution of employment sectors after controlling other factors, Table 
5.3 displays the predicted probability of employment status for the youths by survey 
year. It further illustrates the growth of the private/other sector. After controlling 
other characteristics, the probability of working in the private/other sector for an 
average young worker was .09 in 1989, and the probability has increased to .28 in 
1997. In contrast with the expansion of the private/other sector, the state/collective 
sector and the family farming have declined. The probability of working in the 
state/collective sectors has gone down from .42 in 1989 to .25 in 1997 for the young 
workers. Similarly, the probability of working on the family farm was .33 in 1989 and 
decreased to .20 in 1997.  
In brief, the distribution of the employment sectors of the young workers 
between ages 17 to 24 has significantly changed from 1989 to 1997. As the market 
economy expands, young workers are more likely to work in the private/other sector 
and less likely to work in the state/collective sector or on the family farm.  
Effects of Education 
In Table 5.2, it is clear that education has strong effects on the employment 
sectors of young workers. Relative to the young workers with primary school 
education or less, those with middle school education are more likely to work for the 
state/collective sector or the private/other sector rather than on family farm. That 
advantage of education is even greater among those with high school or higher 




private/other sector, the youths with middle school education are less likely to work 
in the private/other sector than those with primary school or less education. Similarly, 
the youths with high school or higher education are less likely to work in the 
private/other sector than those with primary school or less education. In other words, 
better-educated young workers are more likely to work for the state/collective sector 
than for the private/other sector.  
The effects of education is further explained in Table 5.4, which presents the 
predicted probabilities of not working, staying in school, and working in different 
sectors for the youths with different levels of educational achievement. For an 
average worker with primary school or no education, the probability of working on 
family farm is .77. The probability will drop to .35 for an average worker with middle 
school education. If the worker has high school or higher education, the probability 
becomes even lower (.02). Interestingly, while middle school education would 
increase the probability of getting a job in the private/other sector from .07 to .15 for 
the young workers, a further improvement of the education level to high school or 
above decreases the probability of working in the private/other sector to .09. With 
regard to the state/collective sector, young workers with middle school education 
have some advantages in entering that sector (probability = .32) relative to those with 
only primary school or no education (probability = .09). The advantage of getting a 
job in the state/collective sector brought about by education further increases for a 
young worker with some high school or more education (probability = .38). When 
reading the probabilities of working in different employment sectors, it should be 




education level increases, which is confirmed by the increase of the probability of 
being in school from .00 to .41 as the education level changes from primary or no 
education to high school or more education. Therefore, the effects of high school or 
higher education on working in the state/collective sector or the private/other sector 
are compressed due to the large increase of the probability of staying out of the labor 
force. Focusing on the youth that are already in the labor force, the probability of 
working in the state/collective sector or the private/other sector will further increase 
as the education level becomes high school or more education (results not shown 
here).  
To detect the period difference of the education effects, the interactions 
between year and education levels are added to the model (Table 5.5). The likelihood-
ratio test shows that the model in Table 5.5 is significantly better comparing to the 
model in Table 5.2, indicating that there is a notable period difference of education 
effects. The coefficients of the interactive terms in the model suggest that the positive 
effect of high school or more education has become stronger on sending young 
workers to the state/collective sector versus farming (coef. = 1.035) from 1989 to 
1997. In addition, the high school or more education has increased the gap in the 
likelihood of entering the private/other sector versus the state/collective sector (coef. 
= -.995) in 1997. Nevertheless, the effect of high school or more education on the 
probability of working in the private/other sector versus farming does not change 
significantly between 1989 and 1997.  
In Table 5.6, it is obvious that in 1989 the probability of finding a job in the 




respondent has middle school education, and the difference in the probability of 
entering the state/collective sector versus family farming further increases among 
those with high school or more education. In 1997, however, the probability of 
getting a job in the state/collective sector does not outrun the probability of farming 
until the respondent reaches the high school education. The finding suggests that, 
relative to working on the family farm, it has become more difficult for the youths to 
enter the state/collective sector over time in the 1990s in terms of its requirement on 
young workers’ educational achievement.  
Table 5.6 also shows that the probability of working in the private/other sector 
is always lower than the probability of working in the state/collective sector among 
the young workers in 1989 regardless of the education levels. Nevertheless, young 
workers with middle school or less education have a higher probability to find a job 
in the private/other sector relative to the state/collective sector in 1997. Only among 
those with high school or more education, the probability of working in the 
private/other sector becomes lower than the probability of working in the 
state/collective sector in 1997. Therefore, comparing to the entry of the 
state/collective sector, high school education demarcates the downward turn of the 
relative probability of entering the private/other sector in 1997. Such a dividing line 
on the relative probability of working in the private/other sector versus the 
state/collective sector by education does not exist in 1989. Considering that the 
state/collective sector has been declining in the 1990s, the finding suggests that the 




school or more education. As a result, the educational differences in the likelihood of 
getting a job in the state/collective sector have increased.  
In sum, for the youths, education has a strong impact on the probability of 
entering different employment sectors. Better education obviously keeps the young 
respondents out of family farming and improves their chance of working in the 
state/collective sector or in the private/other sector. Between the state/collective 
sector and the private/other sector, the better-educated young workers are more likely 
to work for the state/collective sector. As to the change of the education effects over 
time, it is found that high school education has become more important in sending 
young workers to the state/collective sector versus family farming or the private/other 
sector.   
Effects of Family Background: Social Capital versus Family Strategy 
The coefficients of the three dichotomous variables in Table 5.2—whether the 
respondent has any other family member in the state/collective sector, in the 
private/other sector, or in family farming—tell us that the effect of family background 
in one employment sector works mainly as the social capital in helping young 
workers locate a job in the same sector. The hypothesized effect of the risk 
diversification strategy cannot be found. For instance, if a respondent has other family 
members in the state/collective sector, he or she is more likely to work in the 
state/collective sector than in the private sector (coef. = -1.140 for private/other sector 
versus state/collective sector) or on the family farm (coef. = 1.526 for state/collective 
sector versus farming). Similarly, for young workers with family members in the 




two sectors are greatly increased (coef. = 2.114 for private/other sector versus 
farming; coef. = 1.452 for private/other sector versus state/collective sector). Between 
family farming and the state/collective sector or the private/other sector, having other 
family members working on the family farm is negatively related with an individual’s 
probability of working in either of the nonagricultural sector (coef. = -3.181 for 
state/collective sector versus farming; coef. = -2.764 for private/other sector versus 
farming).  
Furthermore, the presence of other family members in one employment sector 
affects the probability of young workers working in the other two sectors. 
Specifically, having other family members in one of the nonagricultural sectors is 
helpful for finding jobs in the other nonagricultural sector versus working on the 
family farm, and young workers coming from farmers’ families—with other members 
working on the family farm—are more likely to get into the private/other sector if 
they work on off-farm jobs. For example, for a young worker who has another family 
member in the state/collective sector but wants to find a job between the private/other 
sector and family farming, the odds of getting a job in the private/other sector are 
about 1.5 times (e.386 = 1.47) higher than another worker without any family member 
in the state/collective sector. Likewise, having other family members in the 
private/other sector will increase an individual’s chance of getting a job in the 
state/collective sector by 1.9 times (e.663 = 1.94) if the choice has to be made between 
the state/collective sector and family farming. For young workers from farmers’ 




sector versus the state/collective sector is nearly 1.7 times (e.507 = 1.66) higher than 
those from non-farmer families.  
The predicted probabilities in Tables 5.7 to 5.9 further illustrate the influence 
of the family background on the entry of different sectors for the young workers. 
Table 5.7 displays the predicted probabilities of employment status by whether the 
family has any other member in the state/collective sector or not. For the youths with 
a family member in the state/collective sector, the probability of getting a job in that 
sector is as high as .66, while the probability becomes much lower (.11) if the family 
does not have any member in that sector. Moreover, youths with some family 
background in the state/collective sector have a much lower probability of working on 
the family farm (.04) than those without such a family background (.68). Although 
the absolute level of the probability of working in the private/other sector does not 
vary much between the young workers with (.09) and without (.12) family connection 
in the state/collective sector, it is obvious that the odds ratio of working in the 
private/other sector versus farming is much larger for the youths with family 
background in the state/collective sector (0.09/0.04 = 2.39) than those without 
(0.12/0.68 = .17).  
From Table 5.8, we see that the probability of working in the private/other 
sector for the youths from families with any other member in the private/other sector 
is .38, and the probability is .10 for those from families without any member in the 
sector. In addition, having another family member in the private/other sector also 
decreases the probability of farming (.09), while the probability of farming is .37 for 




probability of working in the state/collective sector for the youths with the family 
background in the private/other sector is lower (.28) than for those without such 
family background (.35), the odds ratio of working in the state/collective sector 
versus farming for the former (0.28/0.09 = 2.98) is still much higher than for the latter 
(0.35/0.37 = .93).  
In Table 5.9, it is obvious that the probability of working on the family farm is 
much higher for the youths from families with other members working on the farm 
(.74) than for those with no other member working as a farmer (.01). Furthermore, the 
probabilities of working in the state/collective sector are different between young 
workers with and without the family background in farming. For the former, the 
probability is .10; and for the latter, the probability is .61. There is little difference in 
the probability of finding a job in the private/other sector between the youths with and 
without the family connection in farming.  
The predicted probabilities in Tables 5.7 to 5.9 clearly demonstrate that 
having another family member in one employment sector facilitates the entry into that 
sector for the young workers. Moreover, having other family members in the 
state/collective sector or the private/other sector greatly decreases the probability of 
working on the family farm for the youths. Furthermore, the youths from farmers’ 
families face a much lower chance of getting a job in the state/collective sector than 
those from non-farmers families. It should be noted that the relatively higher 
probability of entering one nonagricultural sector versus farming for young workers 
with the family connection in the other nonagricultural sector is mainly because the 




youths away from farming. Similarly, since the young workers from the families 
without any member working as farmers are mostly absorbed by the state/collective 
sector, the odds ratio of entering the private/other sector to the state/collective sector 
is lower for them than for the youths from farmers’ families.  
The likelihood-ratio test for the model with the interactions between the 
presence of another family member in the private/other sector and the year reveal that 
the effect of having another family member in the private/other sector on allocating 
young workers into different employment sectors has significantly changed from 
1989 to 1997 (Table 5.11). Nevertheless, the same statistical tests show that there are 
no significant period differences on the effects of having another family member in 
the state/collective sector (Table 5.10) and having another family member in family 
farming (Table 5.12).  
The coefficients of the interactive term in Table 5.11 suggest that the effect of 
having other family members in the private/other sector has greatly strengthened in 
placing young workers into the private/other sector or into the state/collective factor 
relative to farming in 1997. However, there is no significant difference in the effect of 
having other family members in the private/other sector in sending young workers 
into the private/other sector versus the state/collective sector from 1989 to 1997. 
Table 5.13 presents the predicted probabilities of the employment sectors for young 
workers by their family background in the private/other sector in 1989 and 1997 
separately. In 1989, the probability of entering the private/other sector is .25 for 
young workers with family connection in the private/other sector. In 1997, the 




Hence, having family members in the private/other sector has become even more 
influential in improving a young worker’s chance of entering the private/other sector 
in 1997. Meanwhile, having other family members in the private/other sector has 
become more efficient in finding off-farm jobs for the young workers from 1989 to 
1997. In 1989, the probability of working on the family farm for a young worker with 
family members in the private/other sector is .22, and the probability of farming has 
dropped to .10 in 1997. Besides, the predicted probability of working in the 
state/collective sector for young workers has declined from .34 in 1989 to .18 in 
1997. However, the relative probability of finding a job in the state/collective sector 
to farming for young workers with the family background in the private/other sector 
has become higher in 1997 (0.18/0.10 = 1.88) than in 1989 (0.34/0.22 = 1.54) because 
of the rapid decline of the probability of farming in 1997. In brief, the family 
background in the private/other sector has become more powerful in sending young 
workers to the private/other sector and keeping them out of farming over time. It is 
also found that having other family members in the private/other sector has a stronger 
effect on helping young workers enter the state/collective sector, but such effect 
should be attributed to the growing influence of the family connection in the 
private/other on finding off-farm jobs for its workers.  
To sum it up, the family strategy effect of the family background in the 
employment sectors is not found among young workers between ages 17 to 24 in the 
CHNS data. Rather, having other family members in an employment sector serves as 
the social capital by greatly increasing a young worker’s chance of entering the same 




having family members in the state/collection sector or in family farming, the change 
is not statistically significant. More interestingly, the social capital effect for having 
family members in the private/other sector has increased significantly from 1989 to 
1997. These findings disagree with the market transition theory, according to which 
the development of the market economy will increase the importance of human 
capital on the job market and decrease the importance of other capitals, including 
social capital. Actually, as the private/other sector grows, it becomes a more attractive 
employment sector than before, resulting in the increase of the importance of having 
the family connection in the sector in helping young workers find a job there. 
However, it is important to note that the present analysis focuses on the early career 
for young workers where family connections may be more important than the later 
career. This is the topic of investigation in Chapter 6. 
Effects of Gender 
There is no significant difference between young men and women on their 
employment sectors (Table 5.2). Although the overall gender difference in 
employment sectors is not significant, the gender effect has noticeably changed over 
time. Table 5.14 displays the model with the interaction between year and gender. 
The likelihood ratio test shows that it is a significant improvement from the model 
without the interactive term. The coefficient of variable ‘Female’ indicates that 
in1989 young women are significantly less likely to join the private/other sector 
versus to work on the family farm comparing to young men. In 1997, however, the 
gender gap between entering the private/other sector and working on the family farm 




interactive term. Moreover, young women seem to have a significantly higher 
probability in finding a job in the private/other sector relative to the state/collective 
sector than young men in 1997.  
The predicted probabilities of the employment status for men and women in 
1989 and 1997 separately in Table 5.15 further illuminate the change of the gender 
gap in employment sectors over time. In 1989, the probability of working in the 
private/other sector for young women is .07, which is lower than the probability for 
young men (.11). The probability of entering the private/other sector has increased for 
both men and women in 1997. Nevertheless, the growth is much faster among young 
women than among young men. Consequently, young women have a higher 
probability of working in the private/other sector (.31) than young men (.25) in 1997. 
At the same time, the probabilities of entering the state/collective sector and farming 
have both dropped to the level that is lower than the probability of working in the 
private/other sector for young men and women from 1989 to 1997. In spite of the 
slightly higher probability of working in the state/collective sector for young men and 
the slightly lower probability of farming for women in 1997, the overall probability of 
working outside the private/other sector is similar for the young men and women. A 
further look at Table 5.15 tells us that although the probability of not working is much 
higher for young women (.16) than for young men (.08) in 1989, the probability of 
unemployment for young men has increased to .19 in 1997 while the unemployment 
rate remains stable over time for young women. In addition, the difference in the 
probability of being in school is .01 between young men and women in 1989, and the 




women’s higher probability of entering the private/other sector in 1997 can be largely 
attributed to their lower probabilities of not working and staying in school.  
In sum, the gender difference in the job placement across employment sectors 
among young workers is found in the private/other sector. Initially, young men were 
more likely to enter the private/other sector than young women in 1989. Interestingly, 
the gender gap has been reversed in 1997 due to the more rapid growth of the 
private/other sector among young women than among young men in the 1990s. The 
driving force behind it could be the rising demand on female labor in the private/other 
sector as the sector expands. The female advantage in entering the private/other sector 
is a mixture of good news and bad news. On the one hand, the advantage has 
provided young women work opportunities off-farm. On the other hand, the increased 
work opportunities may become a distraction of staying in school for young women 
and generate the gender gap in tertiary education, which may affect the labor market 
outcome in later life. Since the differences in the probabilities of working in the 
state/collective sector or farming between young men and women are insignificant in 
both years and the opposite gender effects of entering the private/other sector in 1989 
and 1997 must have canceled out each other for the whole sample, overall there is no 
significant gender difference in the job placement across employment sectors.  
Effects of Control Variables 
Among the control variables, we see that age, marital status, residence, and 
province are the ones of significance in affecting the employment sectors of young 
workers (Table 5.2).  Variables about demographic structure of the family, including 




household, and the number of working age (20-49) adults in the family, do not show 
significant influence on young workers’ chances of working in different employment 
sectors.  
Relative to young workers between ages 20 and 24, those under age 20 are 
less likely to work in the state/collective sector than to work on the family farm, and 
more likely to work in the private/other sector than to work in the state/collective 
sector. There is no significant difference on the chances of working in the 
private/other sector and on the family farm by age. Therefore, older age appears to be 
an advantage to get a job in the state/collective sector among young workers, at least 
among this sample of youthful workers. The finding might reflect both the demand 
and the supply of the labor force in the state/collective sector. On the demand side, 
the state/collective sector may set a higher threshold of age when recruiting workers. 
On the supply side, workers at age 20 and above may have a stronger desire on a 
stable job in the state/collective sector than their younger counterparts because they 
are starting their own families.   
Comparing to the probability of working on the family farm, being married is 
negatively associated with working for the state/collective sector or for the 
private/other sector, and the effects are significant. However, the causal relationship 
between marital status and employment sector can be in both directions. It is possible 
that young farmers are getting married earlier than other young workers working in 
the nonagricultural sectors. It is also possible that being married makes it more 
difficult for workers to migrate for jobs. Since most jobs in the state/collective or 




villages are more likely to stay on the family farm in the village rather than finding 
jobs in nonagricultural sectors elsewhere due to the difficulty of family migration. In 
spite of the negative association between being married and working in 
nonagricultural sectors, there is no significant correlation between being married and 
working for the private/other sector versus working for the state/collective sector.  
Relative to city residents, those individuals who live in the suburbs, towns, 
and villages have a much lower probability to work in the state/collective sector or 
the private/other sector than working on the family farm. This should not be 
surprising considering that the jobs in the state/collective sectors mostly concentrate 
in cities and the growth of the private/other sector is fastest in cities as well. It is 
interesting, however, that the residence does not affect the young workers’ chances of 
working for the state/collective sector versus the private/other sector.  
Young workers in the northeast provinces (Liaoning and Heilongjiang) are 
less likely to work for the private/other sector than on the family farm relative to their 
counterparts from provinces in central China (Henan, Hubei, and Hunan). Except for 
that, there are no significant differences between young workers in the northeast and 
central provinces with regard to their probabilities of working for the state/collective 
sector versus family farming or versus private/other sector. Comparing to young 
workers in central provinces, those in the coastal provinces (Shandong and Jiangsu) 
have a better chance to work in the state/collective sector or the private/other sector 
versus on the family farm. However, the probabilities of working in the private/other 
sector versus in the state/collective sector between young workers from coastal and 




provinces (Guangxi and Yunnan), they have a higher probability to work in the 
private/other sector versus farming or working for the state/collective sector 
comparing to young workers in the central provinces. Their probabilities of working 
for the state/collective sector versus farming, however, are lower than their 
counterparts in the central provinces. These findings may reflect the different 
experiences of different sects of China during the economic reform era. The coastal 
provinces are the ones that gain most from the economic growth, and the two coastal 
provinces surveyed by CHNS are economically successful in both the state/collective 
sector and the private/other sector. Therefore, relative to the central provinces, young 
workers of the coastal provinces have sufficient job opportunities in both sectors. The 
northeast and the central provinces are similar in many ways: their state and 
collective enterprises are not doing well as the reform in the state/collective sector is 
getting serious in the 1990s, and they have lagged behind in the expansion of the 
private businesses. But the difference is that the northeast provinces face less pressure 
on land in agriculture due to a higher land/person ratio there than the rest of the 
country. So the family farming sector in northeast provinces is able to accommodate 
more young workers than the sector in central provinces. The western provinces are 
the least developed economically: they don’t have a strong state/collective sector, and 
their land/person ratio is extremely low because of the mountains in the area. 
Therefore, even though the private/other sector in that part of China is not well 
developed, it absorbs more young workers than the private/other sector in central 





Using the cross-sectional data derived from the first and the fourth wave of 
CHNS, the job placement across employment sectors among young workers aged 17 
to 24 is examined in this chapter. In general, a large proportion (40%) of the young 
workers are still working as farmers in the 1990s, and the state/collective sector is 
more popular among the young workers than the private/other sector. However, 
young workers of the year 1997 are more likely to find a job in the private/other 
sector and less likely to enter the state/collective sector or to work on the family farm 
relative to young workers of 1989. The findings are consistent with the trend of the 
growth of the private/other sector and the decline of the state/collective sector and 
farming in the economy in the 1990s.  
In this chapter, I also discussed the effects of human capital, family 
background, and gender on the job placement across employment sectors among 
young workers and how those effects have changed over time. Human capital, 
measured by education, has strong influences on the employment sector of the young 
workers. Better education helps in getting an off-farm job for young workers. 
Between the two off-farm sectors, young workers with better education are more 
likely to work for the state/collective sector than for the private/other sector. The 
positive effect of high school or more education in sending young workers to the 
state/collective sector versus the other two sectors has become even stronger over 
time. It is understandable that better-educated youths are more likely to work off-
farm. The increased income gap between farming and working in the off-farm sectors 




employment sector to the youths. Therefore, finding off-farm jobs could be 
competitive and make it difficult to enter the off-farm sectors for the young workers 
with low or no education. In spite of the overall decline of the state/collective sector 
in the 1990s, better-educated young workers are still more likely to join the 
state/collective sector than the private/other sector. Moreover, the state/collective 
sector seems to have become more demanding on its young employees’ educational 
achievement. The counter-intuitive finding might be understood by taking into 
account the selectivity issue when the state/collective sector is on decline. The firms 
and institutions left in the state/collective sector are very likely the ones that are still 
doing well in the 1990s and therefore remain attractive to qualified young workers.  
The social capital effects of the family background in the employment sectors 
seem to overwhelm the necessity of diversifying the risks among family members in 
the reform era. Having other family members in one sector greatly increases a young 
worker’s chance of getting a job in the same sector. The finding suggests that 
although risk diversification might be a concern for Chinese families and some of 
them might be able to successfully execute the strategy during the economic reform 
era, more families are constrained by their resources, especially social capital, and not 
able to send the youths in their families to different employment sectors from other 
family members. This is consistent with another empirical study, which found that the 
Chinese households are more likely to “specialize” in one employment sector rather 
than “diversifying” into different sectors (Entwisle et al. 2000). Moreover, the social 
capital in the state/collective and the private/other sectors are found to be equally 




members working on the farm is indeed an obstacle (or negative social capital) for 
young workers from this kind of family background to enter either of the off-farm 
sectors. These can be understood as the continuity of the rigid segregation between 
the agricultural and the nonagricultural sector under the state socialist economy. 
Despite that the economic reform has provided new off-farm job opportunities for 
young men and women from farmers’ family, the hierarchy of employment sectors is 
still highly visible in the 1990s. Furthermore, the social capital effect of having 
family members in the private/other sector has become more influential in helping 
young workers find a job in the private/other sector and keeping them off the farm in 
1997. These findings suggest that the further progress of the market economy does 
not necessarily decrease the significance of the family as the social capital in 
determining individuals’ employment sectors. On the contrary, as the private/other 
sector grows and becomes a more attractive employment sector, the value of the 
social capital in that sector increases.  
For the cross-sectional sample of young workers from 1989 and 1997 as a 
whole, there is no significant gender difference on their employment sectors. 
Nevertheless, the gender effect on the probability of working in the private/other 
sector has some noticeable changes over time. While in 1989 young men are more 
likely to work in the sector than young men, the gender effect has flipped in 1997 and 
young women have a higher probability to work in the sector than young men. The 
changes of the gender effects are interesting in the way that the increased probability 
for women to work in the private/other sector does not result from the decreased 




Rather, the growth of young women’s share in the private/other sector is mostly due 
to the decline of their probability to stay out of work or stay in school. This finding 
implies that there is an increase in the demand of young female workers in the off-
farm sectors in the 1990s, which might be the consequence of the growth of labor-
intensive manufacture industry and service industry. It is also possible that the jobs 
with fastest growth rate on the labor market are considered as “female” jobs so that 
young men are reluctant to take those jobs.  
In conclusion, both human capital and social capital are important in 
determining the employment sectors of young workers. Additionally, the effect of 
tertiary education has become stronger, and the social capital in the private/other 
sector has become more powerful. Although there is no significant gender segregation 
on employment sectors among young workers, young women seem to have become 
more active in the private/other sector as the economic reform proceeds. The labor 
market experience of young workers during the 1990s demonstrated the importance 
of human capital, social capital and, to some extent, gender on influencing the starting 
point of Chinese workers on the ladder of employment sectors. The next question is 
how the same set of variables affects the job shift across employment sectors, which 




Chapter 6:  To Change or Not to Change? Job Shifts across 
Employment Sectors among Older Workers 
 
Focusing on the workers who were between ages 25 to 44 in 1989 and stayed 
in the labor force till 1997, this chapter analyzes the factors determining the job shifts 
across employment sectors. There are four outcomes of interest. The first one is the 
overall job mobility across all employment sectors, and the rest are about the three 
possible destinations of the job shift: moving to the state/collective sector, moving to 
the private/other sector, and moving to family contract farming. Since all the 
outcomes are dichotomous variables, logit models are used for the multivariate 
analysis. In these analyses, the independent variables include the individual and 
family characteristics of the workers in 1989, among which I will concentrate on the 
influences of the worker’s original employment sector, human capital, family 
background, and gender. When discussing the gender differences on job shifts across 
employment sectors, the interactive effects of gender and marital status and of gender 
and original employment sector are investigated. The effects of the control variables 
will be discussed following the key independent variables.  
Effects of Original Employment Sectors 
Table 6.1 displays the cross-tabulation of the employment sector in 1989 and 
in 1997 for workers aged 25 to 44 in 1989. It is clear that about one in four workers 
changed their employment sectors by 1997. Moreover, depending on the original 
employment sector in 1989, the mobility rate across employment sectors varies. 




workers  changed their employment sectors during the period. Farmers are the least 
mobile group: only 19 percent  had moved to a different sector. Workers of the 
state/collective sector are in the middle: about 33 percent of them had gone to a 
different sector by 1997. It should be mentioned that the overall mobility rate and the 
mobility rate of the state/collective sector might be underestimated because the panel 
sample has lost many observations from the state/collective sector and it is very likely 
that the survey cannot trace those individuals and households because they have 
changed their jobs, although we have no idea if their job shifts are mostly within or 
across employment sectors.  
Consistent with the secular trend of the growth of the private/other sector 
during the 1990s, the private/other sector is the most common destination of the job 
shifts, with 11 percent of the workers moving into that sector. About 8 percent of the 
workers moved to family farming, and 5 percent to the state/collective sector. It is 
surprising to see that there are more workers transferring to family farming than to the 
state/collective sector, not only because family farming is the least desirable 
employment sector (especially for workers who have worked off farm) but also 
because farming land usually cannot be contracted to urban residents. The distribution 
of the destination employment sectors by the workers’ original employment sector 
discloses that actually among workers from the state/collective sector, 20.4 percent  
have moved to farming, and 12.8 percent to the private/other sector. Similarly, 23.8 
percent of workers from the private/other sector have shifted into family farming, 
while only 16.7 percent of them have transferred to the state/collective sector. The 




workers in CHNS may be explained by two reasons. First, the CHNS data have “rural 
bias” because the survey sampled more observations in rural areas than in urban 
areas. But CHNS never provided weighting variables to correct such bias. And the 
transition from nonagricultural sector to family contract farming may be more 
common and easy in rural areas even if the workers have worked off farm. Secondly, 
the panel sample for the analysis is also somewhat biased because the observations 
that have remained in the survey are more rural than those who have left. Therefore, 
the job shifts between the state/collective sector and the private/other sector might be 
underestimated due to the great loss of urban workers in the sample. With regard to 
the destination employment sector for the farmers, 7.2 percent have moved to the 
state/collective sector and 11.7 percent to the private/other sector. That is 
understandable because the private/other sector is more flexible in hiring workers 
from rural areas and without the permanent household registration of urban residence. 
The multivariate analysis (Model 1, Table 6.2) shows that the mobility rate of 
the farmers is significantly lower than the rate of state/collective sector workers. The 
difference of the mobility rate is insignificant between workers of the state/collective 
and the private/other sector. As for the destinations of the job shifts for workers from 
different employment sectors, the move to the family farming is still more common 
than the transition to the other nonagricultural sector among workers from both the 
state/collective sector and the private/other sector even after controlling many 
variables. And for farmers, the private/other sector is a more common destination 
than the state/collective sector. Further analyses find that the farmers are more likely 




difference is statistically significant (Model 3, Table 6.2). However, there is no 
significant difference between farmers and workers of the private/other sector on their 
chances of moving into the state/collective sector (Model 2, Table 6.2). Neither is 
there any significant difference between the workers of the state/collective sector and 
those of the private/other sector on the likelihood of moving to family farming.  
In sum, the overall rate of job mobility across employment sectors is about 25 
percent among workers who were between ages 25 to 44 in 1989. Farmers have the 
lowest chance to change their employment sector. Workers of the state/collective 
sector have a slightly lower rate of job mobility across employment sector than 
workers of the private/other sector, but the difference is not significant after 
controlling workers’ characteristics. Among the workers who have changed their 
employment sectors, those from nonagricultural sectors are more likely to retreat to 
farming than to move between the nonagricultural sectors (although this estimate 
might be biased by the features of the CHNS data and the panel sample). As for 
farmers who have changed the employment sector, they are more likely to go to the 
private/other sector than to the state/collective sector.   
Effects of Education 
From Model 1 in Table 6.2, we see that the effect of education on the overall 
job change across employment sector is not statistically significant, which runs 
contrary to the research hypothesis on the inversed U-shape relationship between 
educational achievement and job mobility across employment sectors.  
But education matters in determining the destination employment sector of the 




more likely a worker is to move into the state/collective sector. Compared to workers 
of middle school education, workers with no education or only primary education 
have significantly lower probability of transferring to the state/collective sector. 
Workers with high school or more education are more likely to make such a 
transition, although the difference between them and those with middle school 
education is not statistically significant. That means middle school education is the 
threshold level of educational achievement that divides the workers into two groups 
regarding the access to the state/collective sector in their later stage of the career 
development: those with middle school or higher education have a higher probability 
of moving into the state/collective sector than those with less than middle school 
education.  
With regard to the job shift toward the private/other sector (Model 3, Table 
6.2), it is clear that, relative to the workers with middle school education, those 
without any formal education are significantly less likely to transfer to the 
private/other sector. The workers with primary education or high school or more 
education are also less likely to move to the private/other sector comparing with those 
with middle school education, but the differences are not statistically significant. 
Hence, the educational threshold for the movement to the private/other sector seems 
to be primary education. While there is no difference between workers with only 
primary education and those with more higher education on their chances to move 
into the private/other sector, workers without primary education are significantly 




Model 4 clearly shows that the association between education and the chance 
of moving into family farming is negative (Table 6.2). Compared to workers with 
middle school education, workers with no formal education have a significantly 
higher probability of making the transition to family farming. Relative to middle-
school educated workers, workers with primary education are more likely to move to 
family farming, and workers with high school or more education are less likely to do 
so, although the effects are not statistically significant. Therefore, primary education 
is the threshold level of education to keep workers out of family farming. Workers 
with at least some primary education are less likely to move from the nonagricultural 
sectors to family farming than those without any formal education.  
The research hypotheses on the effects of human capital on job shifts across 
employment sectors are partially supported by the importance of educational 
achievement in helping the workers transfer to the state/collective sector or to the 
private/other sector or keep them away from the family farming. Nevertheless, the 
association between education and the probability of moving to each employment 
sector is not linear. As a matter of fact, there appears to be a different threshold level 
of education for transferring to an employment sector from other sectors. For the 
transfer to the state/collective sector, middle school education makes the difference. 
Primary education makes it easier to move to the private/other sector and to stay out 
of family farming. Moreover, probably because of the threshold level of education for 
moving in varies for each employment sector, the research hypothesis on the effect of 
education on the overall rate of job mobility across employment sector cannot be 




The relatively low requirement regarding education for transfers into the 
private sector than for transfers into state/collective sectors is different from the 
research hypotheses, which expect that the state/collective sector and the private/other 
sector have similar educational requirements. There are two possible explanations for 
the lower educational threshold of transferring to the private/other sector than of 
moving to the state/collective sector. On the one hand, the employers in the 
private/other sector might be more flexible regarding education due to the lack of 
regulations on the recruitment of workers in the sector. In contrast, the employers in 
the state/collective sector must follow the regulations when they recruit workers, 
which usually put middle school education as the minimum requirement on 
education. On the other hand, self-employment (which is a substantial component of 
the private/other sector) does not have any formal requirement on education.  
To sum it up, education does not have a uniform and statistically significant 
impact on the likelihood of changing jobs across employment sectors for workers 
aged 25 to 44 in 1989. However, among the workers who had moved to a different 
employment sector, educational achievement determines the destination of the job 
shifts. The workers with no formal education are significantly and constantly 
disadvantaged. They have the lower probability to transfer to the state/collective 
sector or the private/other sector and the higher probability to move into family 
contract farming. Primary education significantly facilitates the transition to the 
private/other sector or prevents the transition to farming. But primary education is not 
enough for increasing the workers’ chances of moving to the state/collective sector, 




reminded that the advantage of better education in increasing the probability of 
moving into the state/collective or the private/other sector and decreasing the 
probability of moving into family farming might be underestimated because the 
workers who stayed in the panel have an averagely lower level of education than 
those who had left the survey. 
Effects of Family Background: Social Capital versus Family Strategy 
The family background and employment location of other household members 
has some influence on the overall change of employment sector for individual 
workers. According to Model 1 (Table 6.2), workers with any other family member in 
the state/collective sector in 1989 are more likely to change their employment sectors 
by 1997 than those without any other family member in the state/collective sector, 
and the effect is statistically significant but having another family member in the 
private/other sector or working on the family farm in 1989 does not have significant 
influence on a worker’s probability to change the job across employment sectors by 
1997. The finding of the significant effect of having other family members in the 
state/collective sector is not sufficient to decide whether the family background works 
as social capital or as the necessity to diversify income sources and therefore affects 
individual workers’ job shifts across employment sectors. Further analyses on the 
association between family background in each employment sector and the direction 
of the job change are necessary to make such a judgment. Model 2 to Model 4 in 
Table 6.2 displays the coefficients of the logit models of the direction of job shifts. 
From Model 2, we see that the probability of moving to the state/collective 




sector in 1989. That is consistent with the social capital hypothesis, which argues that 
the likelihood of moving into an employment sector is increased by the presence of 
another family member in the same sector. However, having another family member 
in the private/other sector or in farming does not have any significant impact on the 
likelihood of moving to the state/collective sector.  
In Model 3, the family background in each employment sector has no 
significant influence on the probability of transferring to the private/other sector. But 
the directions of the coefficients are consistent with the social capital hypothesis: 
having family members in the private/other sector in 1989 is positively associated 
with the likelihood of moving to the sector by 1997. The presence of another family 
member in farming does not affect the probability of moving to family farming 
significantly (Model 4), although having other family members in farming in 1989 is 
positively related with the transition to family farming by 1997.  
In sum, the family’s presence in the state/collective sector not only greatly 
increases individual workers’ probability of changing jobs across employment sectors 
but also significantly improves their chances of moving into the same sector. 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the family background in the state/collective 
sector works as social capital in sending family members from other sectors into the 
state/collective sector. Having other family members in the private/other sector or 
family farming is also positively associated with the likelihood of moving into the 
same sector for individual workers, but such effects are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the social capital hypothesis on the importance of having the family 




supported for the state/collective sector, but cannot be proved for the private/other 
sector or family farming.  
The lack of the significant finding on the social capital effect in the 
private/other sector might be attributed to the relatively small scale of that sector in 
1989. Many individuals who worked in the private sector were self-employed or 
owners of small businesses. Therefore, their ability of helping family members move 
to the sector could be limited. As for the insignificant social capital effect in family 
farming, it is understandable since usually the transfer to family farming from 
nonagricultural sectors is involuntary. For workers who cannot keep their jobs in the 
state/collective sector or the private/other sector, they would seek other opportunities 
in the nonagricultural sectors first and retreating to family farming could be their last 
choice. In that way, having family members in farming may be never fully used as 
social capital by those with the connection.  
Effects of Gender 
Generally speaking, female workers are less likely to change their 
employment sectors from 1989 to 1997 than male workers (Model 1, Table 6.3). The 
introduction of the interactive term between gender and marital status further 
indicates that the female disadvantage in the probability of changing employment 
sectors is especially true for married women (Model 2, Table 6.3). To better 
understand the effects of the interaction between gender and marital status in job 
mobility rate, Table 6.4 displays the predicted probabilities of changing employment 




separately based the estimates of Model 2 in Table 6.3.1  The predicted probability of 
transferring into a different employment sector is .18 for married women; and it is .27 
for married men. The 95% confidence intervals clearly show that the difference on 
the predicted probability between married women and married men is statistically 
significant. Although the predicted probability of changing employment sector seems 
much higher for unmarried women, the difference between them and the other groups 
is not statistically significant possibly due to the small number of unmarried women 
at the age group in the sample. Therefore, the gender difference on job mobility 
across employment sectors is significant among married workers, but insignificant for 
unmarried workers.  
Moreover, the female disadvantage on the chance of changing employment 
sector is not universal for all employment sectors. The coefficients of the interactive 
terms between gender and original employment sector indicate that female farmers 
are significantly less likely to change their employment sectors (Model 3, Table 6.3). 
Based on the model, Table 6.5 presents the predicted probabilities of job mobility 
across employment sectors for male and female workers originated from different 
employment sectors separately. For women who were working on the family farm in 
1989, the probability to move out of it by 1997 is .13. For their male counterparts, the 
probability increases to .24. From the 95% confidence intervals, it is clear that the 
difference between male and female farmers is statistically significant. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
1 Similar with Chapter 5, the predicted probability is calculated by using the “prvalue” procedure in 
STATA provided by Long and Xu (www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/spost.htm). When calculating the 
predicted probabilities, the value of the key independent variable specifies the subgroup and the rest of 




the differences between male and female workers in the state/collective sector or the 
private/other sector are not significant.  
Among the workers who had moved to a different employment sector, female 
workers are generally less likely to move to the state/collective sector (Model 1, 
Table 6.6). The interactive effect of gender and marital status is not significant, and 
the gender effect diminishes after introducing the interactive term in the model 
(Model 2, Table 6.6). It means that the gender difference in the probability of moving 
to the state/collective sector does not vary much by individual’s marital status. Model 
3 (Table 6.6) shows that the interactive effect of gender and family farming is 
statistically significant. It indicates that the female farmers are the most 
disadvantaged in job shift to the state/collective sector among the workers. The 
predicted probabilities in Table 6.7 illustrate the finding. For women who worked on 
the family farm in 1989, their probability of moving to the state/collective sector by 
1997 is only .03. The probability of going to the state/collective sector by 1997 for 
male farmers is .07. And the difference is statistically significant. However, there is 
no significant difference between male and female workers that originated from the 
private/other sector with regard to the likelihood of moving to the state/collective 
sector.  
 Female workers also have a significantly lower probability to move to the 
private/other sector from 1989 to 1997 than male workers (Model 1, Table 6.8). The 
significant and negative interactive effect of gender and marital status implies that 
married women are even more disadvantaged in transferring to the private/other 




to the private/other sector for unmarried male workers, married male workers, 
unmarried female workers, and married female workers. It is obvious that there is a 
significant difference between married male and female workers in the probability of 
transferring to the private/other sector. For married male workers, the probability is 
.11. The probability for married female workers is .07. Although the predicted 
probabilities of unmarried male and female workers appear to be different in large 
scale, the difference is not statistically significant because of the small observation 
number of unmarried workers. Moreover, Model 3 (Table 6.8) demonstrates that 
again female farmers are more disadvantaged in moving from outside to the 
private/other sector. The predicted probabilities in Table 6.10 clearly show that. For 
female farmers, the probability of moving to the private/other sector is .07. For male 
farmers, the probability is .13. And the 95% confidence interval of this pair of 
predicted probabilities prove that the difference of the probability between male and 
female farmers is statistically significant. Nevertheless, there is no significant 
difference between male and female workers coming from the state/collective sector 
on their chances of transferring to the private/other sector.  
In terms of the transition to family farming from nonagricultural sectors, 
surprisingly there is no significant difference between male and female workers 
(Model 1, Table 6.11). The interactive effect of gender and marital status is not 
significant either (Model 2, Table 6.11). However, the coefficient of the interactive 
term of gender and private/other sector is negative and statistically significant (Model 
3, Table 6.11), which means that women from the private/other sector are less likely 




farming for men and women originated from different employment sectors are 
displayed in Table 6.12. While the probability of transferring to family farming is .18 
for male workers who was working for the private/other sector, it is .04 for women 
coming from that sector. The confidence interval shows that the difference is 
significant. In contrast, the probability of moving to family farming is similar for 
male and female workers of the state/collective sector. The male disadvantage in 
staying away from family farming among workers of the private/other sector is 
opposite to the research hypothesis, which predicts that women workers of that sector 
are more likely to retreat to family farming than men workers because agricultural 
work is considered to be more compatible with the responsibility of child care that 
usually falls on women’s shoulders. The unexpected finding implies that women are 
more likely to stay in the private/other sector than men after controlling other 
characteristics of the workers.2  
To sum it up, male and female workers have unequal experiences on the job 
mobility across employment sectors. In addition, the gender inequalities on job shifts 
vary by marital status and the original employment sectors of the workers. In general, 
female workers fall behind male workers on the overall mobility rate. And female 
workers are significantly less likely to move into the state/collective sector or the 
private/other sector. Moreover, there seems to be a “marriage bar” that decreases 
women’s probability to change jobs across employment sectors in general and 
prevents them moving to the private/other sector in specific: the gender inequalities 
on the overall mobility rate and the transfer to the private/other sector are significant 
                                                 
2 In the sample, among the 84 male workers of the sector, 48 (57.1%) stayed in the sector; among the 
42 female workers of the sector, 27 (64.3%) stayed. However, chi-square test shows that the difference 




between married workers, but insignificant between unmarried workers. Furthermore, 
the female disadvantage on job mobility is noteworthy in the farming sector: female 
farmers are significantly less likely to change employment sector and to move to the 
state/collective sector or the private/other sector. There are no such significant gender 
differences among workers in the nonagricultural sectors. Finally, women are not 
always in the disadvantaged position in the labor market. Female workers of the 
private/other sector are actually found to be less likely to retreat to family farming 
than male workers of the private/other sector.  
Effects of Control Variables 
The probability of job change across employment sectors varies by age group. 
Model 1 (Table 6.2) shows that the oldest workers (age 40 to 44) in 1989 are less 
likely to change their employment sectors than the workers at younger age groups. 
The negative effect of age is also found for the transition to the private/other sector 
(Model 2, Table 6.2). Relative to the workers at age 30 to 39 in 1989, those at the 
younger ages (age 25 to 29) have a higher probability to move into the private/other 
sector, and those at the older age group (40 to 44) are less likely to move to the 
private/other sector. However, there are no significant age effects on the likelihood of 
moving into the state/collective sector (Model 2, Table 6.2) or family farming (Model 
4, Table 6.2), although the workers at age 30 to 39 seemed to be more likely to make 
such movements than workers at the younger or older age group. The age effects on 
the overall mobility across employment sector and on the particular move to the 
private/other sector are understandable for at least three reasons. First of all, it is 




they are growing older. Secondly, age can be viewed as a proximate to the workers’ 
experience in one employment sector. Job change always involves some cost. The 
longer a worker has worked in one employment sector, the higher the opportunity 
cost would be for leaving that sector. Last, there is strong age discrimination in the 
job market in China. Many employers, especially those in the private/other sector, set 
upper limit of age when they recruit new employees. That practice must have limited 
the job opportunities in the private/other sector for older workers.  
Marital status per se does not have significant impact on the job shifts across 
employment sectors. The insignificant effect of marital status is a little bit surprise 
because it is believed that individuals may change their jobs after marriage to 
accommodate new family life or are simply more capable to move to a better job 
through spouse or spouse’s networks. The lack of the finding might be attributed to 
the characteristics of the panel sample, which is dominated by married workers.  
Among the variables measuring the demographic composition of the family, 
having a preschool child at home does not influence the job change across 
employment sectors. Having elders in the family, however, significantly decreases the 
probability of job mobility across employment sectors and the likelihood of the 
transition to the private/other sector. The total number of working age adults in the 
family does not strongly affect the overall change of employment sector, which also 
disapproves the hypothesis of family diversification strategy because a family with 
more working adults should have be more labor resources to assign its members into 
different employment sectors and thus increases their probabilities of changing 




farming are not significantly associated with the total number of working age adults 
of the family either. The only significant effect of the total number of working age 
adults in the family is found for the movement to the state/collective sector: for 
workers who were the only working age adult in the family in 1989, they are more 
likely to move to the state/collective sector than the workers from families with more 
than one working age adults.  
Workers from the family with the highest level of income (7,000 yuan or 
above annually) in 1989 are the most likely to change their employment sectors by 
1997, and the difference between them and workers with a lower family income is 
statistically significant. However, the differences between workers with the lower 
levels of family income are not statistically significant, although workers with lowest 
levels of annual family income (less than 1,000 yuan and 1,000 to 3,000 yuan) seem 
to be more likely to change their employment sectors than those with the mid-level 
family income (3,000 to 5,000 yuan and 5,000 to 7,000 yuan). The findings suggest 
that job change across employment sectors may be financially demanding. The 
analyses on the direction of the job change partially support the idea. Among the 
workers who had changed their employment sectors by 1997, those with the highest 
level of family income in 1989 are the most likely to move to the private/other sector. 
The lower the family income, the lower the probability of moving to the private/other 
sector, although the differences between workers of lower family income are not 
statistically significant. The finding implies that at least the transition to the 
private/other sector requires the family to have some financial cushion. The family 




to the state/collective sector. For the transition to family farming, relative to workers 
with mid level family income (3,000 to 5,000 yuan) in 1989, those from families of 
lower levels of income are more likely to move to family farming, and those with 
higher family income (5,000 to 7,000 yuan) are less likely to do so. This indicates that 
the transition to family farming may be an involuntary move, considering that family 
farming is the least rewarding sector financially. Workers who had failed in the 
nonagricultural sectors chose to withdraw from those sectors and resorted to family 
farming as the backup plan.  
Compared with the city residents, workers from less urban areas, including 
suburbs, towns, and villages, are significantly more active in changing their 
employment sectors from 1989 to 1997. Since a large proportion of older workers in 
urban areas live in the housing supplied by the work organizations in the 
state/collective sector, it might be difficult for them to quit the job in the 
state/collective sector. Not surprisingly, workers from suburbs, towns, and villages 
are more likely to move to the family farming than urban workers. With regard to the 
transition to the private/other sector, workers from towns have a significantly higher 
likelihood to move to the sector than those from cities. However, there is no 
significant difference in moving to the private/other sector between workers from 
cities and those from suburbs or villages. The probability of moving into the 
state/collective sector does not vary by the workers’ residence. When understanding 
the effects of residence on determining job shifts across employment sectors, it 
should be kept in mind that the majority of the lost observations from 1989 to 1997 




the move to the private/other sector for city residents might be underestimated 
because the lost observations are very likely the workers who have changed their 
jobs.  
Workers from different provinces do not have significantly different rates of 
mobility across employment sectors. However, the directions of the job shifts across 
employment sectors are significantly different for workers of different provinces. 
Comparing to the workers from central provinces (Henan, Hubei, and Hunan), 
workers from the coastal provinces (Shandong and Jiangsu) are more likely to move 
to the state/collective sector, and workers from the western provinces (Guizhou and 
Guangxi) are less likely to do so. Workers of the coastal and western provinces are 
more likely to move to the private/other sector than workers of the central provinces. 
On contrast, workers from the coastal and western provinces are less likely to move 
to family farming than workers from the central provinces. In summary, workers of 
the coastal provinces are more active in the transition to the state/collective sector and 
to the private/other sector, but less active in the transition to family farming. Workers 
of the western provinces are more active in the transition to the private/other sector, 
but less active in the transition to the state/collective sector or family farming. 
Workers of the central provinces are more active in the transition to family farming 
and to the state/collective sector, but less active in the transition to the private/other 
sector. Similar with the findings of provincial differences in Chapter 5, those 
differences by province are a reflection of the composition and the strength of the 





Using the panel data from the first and fourth wave of CHNS, this chapter 
examines the job shifts across employment sectors during the 1990s among the 
workers aged 25 to 44 in 1989. It is found that about 25 percent of the workers have 
changed their employment sectors. The farmers have a significantly lower probability 
of changing employment sectors than workers in the nonagricultural sectors, but there 
is no statistically significant difference on the mobility rate between workers of the 
state/collective sector and those of the private/other sector. Surprisingly, family 
farming is more likely to become the destination of job change among the workers of 
nonagricultural sectors than either the state/collective sector or the private/other 
sector. The estimation might be biased, though. Not surprisingly, the private/other 
sector is more likely to absorb workers from the agricultural sector than the 
state/collective sector. Considering the massive attention paid to the rural-to-urban 
migrant workers by the media, the government, and researchers in the 1990s in China, 
the picture drawn from the CHNS panel sample captures two features on the job 
mobility across employment sectors that were largely ignored before. First, it is still 
difficult for farmers to move to off farm jobs in spite of the great increase on the 
absolute number of migrant workers from rural areas in the 1990s. Secondly, it is not 
uncommon for workers of both the state/collective sector and the private/other sector 
to retreat to family farming.  
Although the probability of changing employment sectors is not different 
among workers with different levels of education, education definitely has some 




with at least some middle school education have a better chance to transfer to the 
state/collective sector, and those with at least some primary education are more likely 
to move into the private/other sector. On the other hand, workers with at least some 
primary education are less likely to move from nonagricultural sectors to family 
farming. The findings suggest that the state/collective sector is still more demanding 
on its workers’ educational achievement than the private/other sector, although the 
state/collective sector has started to downsize during the 1990s. Family farming is the 
sector that requires the least on education, which is not a surprise since the sector is 
the least desirable one among all the three employment sectors.  
Having other family members in the state/collective sector facilitates a 
worker’s transition from other sectors to the state/collective sector, and increases a 
worker’s likelihood of changing his or her employment sector no matter which sector 
the worker originally came from. Therefore, the family background in the 
state/collective sector serves as social capital for workers with such a background in 
improving their job mobility in general and in sending them to the sector in specific. 
However, having other family members in the private/other sector or in farming does 
not have significant social capital effects on workers’ job shifts across employment 
sectors.  
Comparing with men, women workers are noticeably less mobile in the labor 
market, and even if they changed their employment sectors, they are less likely to 
transfer to the state/collective sector or the private/other sector. Two groups of 
women are the most disadvantaged in job mobility: married women and women 




bad thing for women. Indeed, women workers have a lower probability of retreating 
to the family farming from the private/other sector.  
In conclusion, human capital, social capital in the state/collective sector, and 
gender are important factors in determining both the overall job mobility across 
employment sectors and the destinations of such job mobility. In addition, the 
requirement on the threshold level education seems to be different for each 
employment sector. The gender differences on job shifts vary by marital status and 





Chapter 7:  Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This dissertation has investigated the impact of the market-oriented economic 
reform on one aspect of the labor market outcomes—individuals’ access to different 
employment sectors in China. In contemporary China, the economy is divided into 
three sectors with distinct institutional arrangements: the state and collective sector, 
the private sector, and the sector of family contract farming. Different employment 
sectors provide different opportunity structures for individuals working in the sectors. 
Therefore, the procedure that sorts individuals into different employment sectors is 
important for understanding the inequalities in other labor market outcomes (wage, 
welfare benefits, career development, etc.) and the process of social stratification in 
the context of China’s economic reform.  
Using the first wave (1989) and the fourth wave (1997) of the CHNS data, this 
study examines the effects of education, family background, and gender on the job 
placement among the employment sectors for young workers (age 17 to 24) and the 
job shifts across the employment sectors for older workers (age 25 to 44). The change 
of these effects on young workers’ job placement from 1989 to 1997 was also 
examined. Different from previous studies whose focus is the relative importance of 
political capital and human capital in determining income inequality in the pre-reform 
and reform-era China, this study recognizes the importance of family background and 
gender as mechanisms of social stratification and paid equal attention to their 
influences as well as the influence of education on individuals’ access to different 




The Chinese workers’ distribution across employment sectors is undoubtedly 
affected by the change of the macroeconomic environment. In the 1990s, China’s 
economy experienced the growth of the private sector and the decline of the 
state/collective sector and the sector of agricultural production. This study finds that 
young workers in 1997 are more likely to work in the private sector and less likely to 
work in the state/collective sector or work on the family farm than their counterparts 
in 1989. Among the older workers who have changed their employment sectors by 
1997, the private sector is more likely to be the destination of the move than the 
state/collective sector or the sector of family farming. However, considering the 
overall low mobility rate (25%) of the older workers, it is possible that a large 
proportion of the rapid growth of the private sector can be attributed to young 
workers who selected the private sector at the early stage of their careers rather than 
to the older workers who joined the sector later in their careers.  
Concerning the effects of education on individuals’ access to the employment 
sectors, this study finds that education is important in determining young workers’ 
employment sectors and older workers’ destination of job shifts. For young workers, 
educational achievement is negatively associated with the probability of working on 
the family farm and positively related with the chance of working in the 
state/collective sector or the private sector. Nevertheless, between the state/collective 
sector and the private sector, it is found that better-educated young workers are more 
likely to enter the former sector. Moreover, such an effect has become stronger over 
time in spite of the decline of the state/collective sector in the economy in the 1990s. 




selective procedure. As a result, the jobs in the state/collective sector not only remain 
their attractiveness to better-educated young workers but also become even more 
competitive. The analyses on the job shifts across employment sectors of older 
workers confirm the findings from the young workers. The education threshold of 
transferring into the state/collective sector is higher than the threshold of moving to 
the private sector. Workers’ education levels are negatively associated with the 
possibility of moving to family farming, and those workers with no formal education 
are significantly more likely to leave their jobs in the state/collective sector or the 
private sector and go to family farming. To sum it up, there is a hierarchical 
distribution of workers with different levels of education across employment sectors 
during the reform era: the state/collective sector has been absorbing better-educated 
workers than the private sector does, and the private sector attracts better-educated 
workers than the sector of family farming does. In addition, the state/collective sector 
shows the tendency of becoming more demanding on its workers’ educational levels.  
With regard to the influences of family background on the access to different 
employment sectors, the social capital hypothesis of family background is fully 
supported by the analyses on young workers and partially supported by the analyses 
on older workers, and the risk diversification hypothesis is rejected. Young workers 
are found to be more likely to work in an employment sector if they have other family 
members in that sector, and that is true for all the three employment sectors. Older 
workers have a better chance to transfer to the state/collective sector if they have 
other family members working in that sector, but the association between a worker’s 




employment sector is not statistically significant for the private sector or the sector of 
family farming. In addition, the analyses on the job placement of young workers find 
that the family connection in the state/collective sector or the private sector greatly 
decreases the probability of working on the family farm, and young workers from 
farmers’ families are significantly disadvantaged in finding off-farm jobs either in the 
state/collective sector or in the private sector. But such effects are not significant in 
the analyses on the job shifts of older workers. These findings suggest that the social 
capital obtained through family members is more critical to young workers than to 
older workers in affecting their access to different employment sectors. It is probably 
because older workers are more likely to develop and use social networks beyond the 
family. Compared to them, young workers are less resourceful and have to rely on 
their own families. Another significant finding from the analyses on the job 
placement of young workers is that the “social capital effect” of having other family 
members in the private sector has become stronger from 1989 to 1997. That 
contradicts the expectation that the importance of family connection in job seeking 
would decrease as the market economy grows. A possible explanation is that the labor 
market in China is still underdeveloped even in late 1990s. The lack of efficient ways 
to find jobs through the labor market (Knight and Yueh 2004) might have forced 
people to depend on informal channels, including family networks. And the 
expansion of the private sector increases the value of the social capital in the sector.  
Gender differences on the access to different employment sectors are found in 
the study, but the effects of gender are more noticeable among older workers, 




is little gender difference in their chances of entering into the state/collective sector or 
on the family farm. The likelihood of working in the private sector is not different 
between young women and young men in 1989, but young women have gained some 
advantage in entering into the private sector in 1997. This finding might reflect the 
increasing demand on young female workers in the private sector in the 1990s. 
Among older workers, it is found that female farmers are less likely to leave the farm 
and move to the state/collective sector or to the private sector than are male farmers. 
Furthermore, married women are less likely to transfer to the private sector than are 
married men. However, the possibility of leaving the state/collective sector or leaving 
the private sector is not different between female workers and male workers. And 
there is no gender difference in the chances of moving to the state/collective sector 
from the private sector or moving to the private sector from the state/collective sector. 
In addition, no gender effect is found on the probability of moving to family farming. 
Actually, women in the private sector have a lower probability to retreat to family 
farming than do men in the private sector. The findings reveal that the growth of the 
private sector does create more work opportunities for women: young women have a 
better chance to work in the sector than young men do; and among older workers who 
worked in the sector, women are less likely to move to family farming than are men. 
But the work opportunities in the private sector are not equally open to all women:  
married female workers and female farmers are less likely to transfer to the sector 
than are their male counterparts. The reforms in the state/collective sector do not 
appear to be hurting women’s access to the sector except that female farmers have a 




Considering the lack of gender differences on job shifts between the state/collective 
sector and the private sector, the observed disadvantages of female farmers in 
transferring to the state/collective sector or the private sector may not be attributed to 
the demand factors of these two sectors. Rather, it is possible that the gendered 
division of labor within farmers’ households have been keeping female farmers on the 
family farm.      
In sum, this study finds that Chinese workers are channeled into different 
employment sectors according to their education levels, family background, and 
gender. In addition to the specific effects of these three factors on the access to the 
employment sectors I discussed above, this study contributes to the market transition 
debate on understanding the procedure of social stratification in the reform era in 
following aspects.  
First of all, the access to different employment sectors is not equally 
distributed among Chinese workers and therefore should be viewed as another 
dimension of social stratification in contemporary China. Both achieved and ascribed 
characteristics have strong influences on the entry to different employment sectors 
among young workers and on the transfer to different employment sectors among 
older workers. If the differentiations in monetary and non-monetary rewards between 
employment sectors persist, the inequalities in the access to employment sectors, 
especially the ones associated with ascribed characteristics of individual workers, 
have far-reaching consequences on the social inequality in China.   
Secondly, the educational differences in the chances of working in different 




the employment sectors guided by state policies in the reform era. Different from the 
prediction of the market transition theory (Nee, 1989, 1996), this study finds that 
individuals with better education (and thus higher level of human capital) do not 
necessarily choose the private sector, which is the closest to the market economy. 
Instead, better-educated workers are more likely to join the state/collective sector, and 
the educational differentiation in the likelihood of getting a job in the state/collective 
sector than in the private sector has become greater in 1997. Such a finding is 
consistent with a study conducted in 1999 on urban households, which found that the 
state sector remains as the preferred destination of job mobility among urban workers 
and rural-to-urban migrant workers (Knight and Yueh 2004). Apparently, the 
state/collective sector still offers sufficient incentives to attract both young and older 
workers with relatively high education levels even during the period when the 
state/collective sector is downsizing due to the ownership reform. In other words, the 
ownership reform of the state-owned and collective enterprises in mid 1990s does not 
weaken the state/collective sector. On the contrary, the reform has refined the sector 
by getting rid of the enterprises with unsatisfactory performances and dismissing 
workers with low skills. Consequently, the state/collective sector has maintained its 
superior position among the employment sectors, although its size has become 
smaller. The finding suggests the persistent power of the state in shaping the 
institutional structure in the reform era, and supports the argument that the state is 
still playing a central role in directing the institutional change in China’s transitional 




Thirdly, the influences of family background and gender after controlling the 
effects of education suggest the importance of social capital and gender as 
mechanisms of social stratification even when the market economy is expanding. 
Researchers should go beyond the dichotomy of political capital versus human capital 
in the market transition debate and pay more attention to other mechanisms of social 
stratification such as social capital and gender. Specifically, the effects of family 
background point out the importance of social capital in status attainment in reform-
era China. On the one hand, the strong “social capital effects” of family background 
in affecting young workers’ employment sectors suggest a high-degree of familial 
inheritance of individuals’ employment sectors. On the other hand, due to the low rate 
of job mobility across employment sectors among older workers, it is very likely that 
an individual’s employment sector in later life is already determined when he or she 
first enters the labor market. Therefore, although the impact of family background on 
the job shift patterns of older workers is not as strong as its impact on the 
employment sectors of young workers, family has been playing a significant role in 
the procedure of status attainment in reform-era China. This is especially important in 
understanding the lack of intragenerational and intergenerational mobility of farmers 
because the chances to work in nonagricultural sectors are significantly lower for the 
youths coming from farmers’ families than for the youths not from farmers’ families, 
and the chances for them to change their employment sector in later life is 
significantly lower than for workers of the nonagricultural sectors. Consequently, 
although the decollectivization of agricultural production has liberated rural labor 




lack of social capital in farmers’ families still constrains their chances of moving to 
the nonagricultural sectors after two decades of the reform. This finding suggests that 
the procedure of social stratification during China’s economic transition is not only 
influenced by human capital and political capital but also affected by social capital, 
especially the social capital gained through family members.  
The effects of gender on the access to different employment sectors suggest 
the coexistence of opportunities and constraints for Chinese women in the economic 
reform era. The emergence of the private sector, especially its rapid growth in the 
1990s, has increased the demand for female labor in the labor markets. Young women 
therefore have a better chance to work in the private sector than young men. Older 
women who joined the private sector in the 1980s seem to be benefiting from the 
expansion of the sector as well because they are less likely to transfer to family 
farming than male workers in the sector. However, it should be noted that the 
increased possibility of working in the private sector for young women does not 
accompany the decline of their share in the other employment sectors. Rather, it is 
partly because young women are less likely to stay in school than young men. The 
interruption of education may hurt young women in the future because recent studies 
found that the increase in gender wage differential in the private sector is largely 
caused by the differences in returns to human capital (Liu et al. 2000). Additionally, 
although young women have a better chance to find a job in the private sector than 
young men, and the state/collective sector is equally accessible to young women and 
young men, young women may suffer from the persistent gender wage gap in both 




2000). Moreover, the gender dynamics within households have put female farmers in 
the disadvantageous position: their chances of moving to off-farm jobs are much 
lower than their male counterparts. Therefore, as suggested by Whyte (2000), the 
forces underlying the gender stratification in contemporary China can be conflicting 
and contradictory. Plus, those forces do not uniformly affect women. Older married 
women may face more discrimination in the labor market and are more likely to be 
constrained by the unequal gender relationships within family than young single 
women.   
 
There are a few limitations of this study. First, the CHNS data is not 
nationally representative data. In the analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the 
province variables show strong effects on influencing individuals’ chances of 
working in different employment sectors. That means the economic structures of the 
surveyed provinces have determined the employment opportunities faced by the 
workers in the data. Therefore, we need to be aware of the bias of the CHNS data 
when interpreting the findings and compare the findings with other researches. 
Secondly, the panel data of older workers suffer from the problem of attrition. Since 
the lost cases are possibly workers who have emigrated from the survey community, 
the overall rate of job mobility across employment sectors is probably underestimated 
in this study. Considering that the workers who had left the survey by 1997 are more 
likely to be in an advantageous position in China’s labor market—they tended to be 
younger, better educated, male, single, employed by the state/collective sector, living 




state/collective sector, the differentiations on job mobility caused by education, 
family background, and gender are possibly underestimated. Thirdly, since the CHNS 
data do not collect any information on the utilization of social networks in job 
searching, the social capital effects of family background on influencing the workers’ 
employment sectors are inferential. It is possible that the similarities of unmeasured 
characteristics of family members (e.g. tastes, preferences, propensities of risk taking, 
etc.) might have some influence on the clustering of family members in the same 
employment sectors.  
In further researches on this topic, I would be interested to examine the 
interactive effects of education, family background, and gender on sending workers 
into different employment sectors. Specifically, will the possession of social capital 
decrease the influences of human capital or vice versa? Are men and women affected 
in the same way by human capital and social capital? In addition, the importance of 
social capital, especially the family networks, in job finding deserves to be 
investigated using updated data because the urban labor market has been rapidly 
developing after 1997. Moreover, the gender differences in the access to employment 
sectors need closer attention. A longitudinal analysis on young workers might be able 
to answer following questions. Does the female advantage in finding jobs in the 
private sector sustain over time? Is it good or bad for women in the long run? 
Between young women who started working in the private sector early and young 
men who stayed in school or out of the labor force, do they have different trajectories 
on their career development? Lastly, as the private sector continues to grow, it is 




Chapter 2, the private sector is a diversified one composed of jobs ranging from well-
paid positions in foreign or joint venture firms to self-employment in the informal 
economy. The factors facilitating the entry to the joint venture firms might be 





Table 2.1 Number (in millions) of Rural Employees: 1979-1997 







































































































































Urban Labor Force State Collective Private/Other
1979 99.8 76.9 22.7 0.2
1980 105.3 80.2 24.3 0.8
1981 110.7 83.7 25.7 1.3
1982 114.9 86.3 26.5 2.1
1983 117.5 87.7 27.4 2.3
1984 122.3 86.4 32.2 3.8
1985 128.1 89.9 33.2 4.9
1986 132.9 93.3 34.2 5.4
1987 137.8 96.5 34.9 6.4
1988 409.4 99.8 35.3 7.6
1989 143.9 101.1 35.0 7.8
1990 147.3 103.5 35.5 8.3
1991 152.7 106.6 36.3 9.8
1992 156.3 108.9 36.2 11.2
1993 159.6 109.2 33.9 16.5
1994 164.1 108.9 32.1 23.0
1995 169.5 109.6 30.8 29.2
1996 171.7 109.5 29.5 32.7
1997 173.4 107.7 28.2 37.5


































































Table 2.3 Urban and Rural Per Capita Annual Income (yuan): 1979-1997  
Year Urban Rural Urban/Rural Ratio
1979 377 160 2.36
1980 439 191 2.30
1981 500 223 2.24
1982 535 270 1.98
1983 573 310 1.85
1984 660 355 1.86
1985 749 398 1.88
1986 910 424 2.15
1987 1,012 463 2.19
1988 1,192 545 2.19
1989 1,388 602 2.31
1990 1,523 686 2.22
1991 1,713 709 2.42
1992 2,032 784 2.59
1993 2,583 922 2.80
1994 3,502 1,221 2.87
1995 4,288 1,578 2.72
1996 4,839 1,926 2.51
1997 5,160 2,090 2.47










































































































Table 2.4 Average Annual Wage (yuan) of Urban Employees by Employment Sector: 
 
1979-1997 
Year State Collective Private/Other
1979 705 542 ------
1980 803 623 ------
1981 812 642 ------
1982 836 671 ------
1983 865 698 ------
1984 1,034 811 1,048
1985 1,213 967 1,436
1986 1,414 1,092 1,629
1987 1,546 1,207 1,879
1988 409 1,426 2,382
1989 2,055 1,557 2,707
1990 2,284 1,681 2,987
1991 2,477 1,866 3,468
1992 2,878 2,109 3,966
1993 3,532 2,592 4,966
1994 4,797 3,245 6,302
1995 5,625 3,931 7,463
1996 6,280 4,302 8,261
1997 6,747 4,512 8,789
Notes: Data not available for private/other sector before 1984. 
Self-employed and employees of domestic private enterprises are not included.















































































Notes: Data not available for private/other sector before 1984.
Self-employed and employees of domestic private enterprises are not included.
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Figure 4.1 Map of China 
 
 




















































































1 The population data come from the Communique on the Results of the 2000 Census: No. 1, No. 2  (in Chinese),
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/index.htm
2 The GDP data come from the Communique on the Economic and Social Development: 2001  (in Chinese),
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/index.htm





Table 4.1 Reasons for Losing Observations across Years in CHNS: 1989 to 1997 
All:  
N=15,917 in 1989
9,107 (57.2%) of them were still available in 1997
Distribution of lost cases
Province being replaced 1,718 25.2%
Community being replaced 817 12.0%
Household being replaced 1,525 22.4%
Individual not in the household 2,750 40.4%
Total 6,810 100.0%
Individuals in employment in 1989 (age 25-44):  
N=4,411 in 1989
2,833 (64.2%) of them were still available in 1997
Distribution of lost cases
Province being replaced 586 37.1%
Community being replaced 253 16.0%
Household being replaced 416 26.4%


































25-29 23.4 35.4 30.9 32.7 50.5
30-39 54.5 48.2 52.6 47.6 37.5
40-44 22.2 16.5 16.6 19.7 12.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Education
No education 13.5 3.7 2.6 3.9 6.5
Primary school 33.5 22.1 22.8 21.6 20.7
Middle school 32.1 41.8 45.1 39.9 35.9
High school 16.5 21.6 16.7 26.7 27.6
College or more 4.5 10.8 12.9 7.9 9.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Gender
Male 51.4 53.8 53.6 50.5 58.5
Female 48.6 46.2 46.4 49.5 41.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Marital Status
Never married 2.7 8.9 3.9 6.0 25.4
Currently married 96.8 89.6 94.8 92.3 72.8
Divored/Widowed/Separated 0.5 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Employment Sector
State and collective 36.2 62.9 64.7 66.1 54.2
Private and other 5.4 7.1 4.7 7.0 13.6
Family farming 58.4 30.0 30.6 26.9 32.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Residence
City 12.1 27.9 25.0 32.2 29.7
Suburb 16.3 17.5 19.6 19.2 9.9
Town 12.4 19.7 21.0 16.1 21.1
Village 59.2 34.9 34.5 32.5 39.3








(Table 4.2 cont’d) 
Family's Background in Each Employment Sector
No other member in state/collective 62.1 35.5 36.4 30.8 39.3
>=1 other member in state/collective 38.0 64.5 63.7 69.2 60.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No other member in private/other 83.9 84.7 91.4 83.4 69.0
>=1 other member in private/other 16.1 15.3 8.6 16.6 31.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No other member in farmily farming 41.1 69.5 72.0 74.3 56.7
>=1 other member in family farming 58.9 30.5 28.0 25.7 43.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0































































State/Collective Private/Other Farming State/Collective Private/Other Farming
Occupation
Professional 12.0 3.5 ------ 15.7 0.6 ------
Administrative/Executive/Manager 5.9 1.2 ------ 9.8 2.3 ------
Office staff 8.8 1.4 ------ 14.6 1.0 ------
Skilled worker 19.8 13.9 ------ 18.7 10.2 ------
Unskilled worker 30.3 13.7 ------ 25.7 21.9 ------
Service worker 9.7 33.4 ------ 2.4 31.4 ------
Driver 1.4 6.4 ------ 9.4 8.7 ------
Farmer ------ ------ 100.0 ------ ------ 100.0
Other 12.1 26.6 ------ 3.8 23.9 ------
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 2,802 425 3,232 1,785 1,062 2,722
Education
No education 2.8 3.3 12.9 0.8 2.2 7.6
Primary school 16.3 28.3 40.9 7.4 16.4 34.5
Middle school 43.9 48.5 37.1 38.4 57.1 48.3
High school 24.4 18.3 9.0 29.4 18.9 9.2
College or above 12.6 1.6 0.2 24.1 5.3 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 2,800 431 3,219 1,792 1,077 2,709
Residence
Urban 31.7 18.5 0.7 32.1 11.4 0.2
Suburb 16.9 12.7 16.7 18.1 19.4 16.8
Town 26.5 24.0 4.2 26.4 23.2 3.1
Village 24.9 44.8 78.3 23.4 46.1 80.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0





Table 5.1 Percentage Distribution of Employment Status for the Youths: CHNS, 1989 
and 1997 
All 1989 1997
Not Working, Not in School 9.5 8.1 11.3
In School 13.2 10.3 17.1
State/Collective Sector 26.2 31.2 19.6
Private/Other Sector 10.8 6.0 17.3
Farming 40.4 44.5 34.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0



































Table 5.2 Multinomial Logit Models of Job Placement across Employment Sectors: 



















































r (year 1989 is omitted)
Year 1997 1.216** 0.734** 0.366 1.704** 1.337**
(0.245) (0.264) (0.197) (0.228) (0.217)
ation (primary school or less is omitted)
Middle school 0.653** 2.022** 0.821** 0.446** -0.375*
(0.177) (0.347) (0.151) (0.155) (0.174)
High school or above 1.126** 5.283** 1.767** 0.994** -0.773**
(0.252) (0.369) (0.206) (0.225) (0.216)
nder (male is omitted)
Female 0.146 0.003 -0.133 -0.057 0.075
(0.137) (0.144) (0.117) (0.131) (0.132)
ing Other Family Member in State/Collective Sector (no  is omitted)
Yes 0.427* 0.588** 1.526** 0.386* -1.140**
(0.189) (0.184) (0.153) (0.159) (0.170)
ing Other Family Member in Private/Other Sector (no  is omitted)
Yes 1.032** 1.002** 0.663** 2.114** 1.452**
(0.178) (0.177) (0.142) (0.160) (0.149)
ing Other Family Member in Farming (no  is omitted)
Yes -3.878** -2.598** -3.181** -2.674** 0.507**
(0.288) (0.272) (0.229) (0.264) (0.179)
e (age 20 to 24 is omitted )
Under 20 0.343* 2.165** -0.564** 0.003 0.566**
(0.153) (0.155) (0.128) (0.136) (0.146)
arital Status (unmarried is omitted)
Married -0.758** -2.914** -0.749** -0.983** -0.234
(0.227) (0.610) (0.179) (0.215) (0.231)
ing Chiild (Age<7) in Family (no is omitted)
Yes 0.368 -0.250 -0.347* -0.099 0.248
(0.195) (0.259) (0.163) (0.179) (0.192)
Having Elderly (Age>=60) in Family (no is omitted)
Yes 0.018 0.140 0.106 -0.179 -0.286
(0.181) (0.176) (0.139) (0.165) (0.159)
umber of Other Working Age (20-49) Adults in Family (two or more is omitted)
Self only -0.172 -0.269 -0.447* -0.273 0.173
(0.271) (0.291) (0.212) (0.259) (0.246)
One -0.079 -0.312 -0.263 -0.171 0.092
































esidence (city is omitted)
Suburb -1.997** -2.251** -2.079** -2.131** -0.052
(0.655) (0.662) (0.634) (0.661) (0.264)
Town -1.663* -1.858** -1.742** -1.994** -0.253
(0.648) (0.657) (0.629) (0.658) (0.254)
Village -2.816** -2.207** -2.692** -2.552** 0.140
(0.648) (0.654) (0.627) (0.652) (0.253)
rovince (central provinces are omitted)
Northeast -0.516 -0.028 -0.169 -0.532 -0.363
(0.292) (0.277) (0.210) (0.280) (0.283)
Coast 0.499* 0.717** 1.170** 0.970** -0.200
(0.207) (0.199) (0.159) (0.195) (0.175)
West -0.154 0.163 -0.467** 0.440** 0.907**
(0.176) (0.178) (0.141) (0.152) (0.161)
nstant 3.554** -0.713 3.524** 3.144** -0.380
(0.740) (0.803) (0.679) (0.714) (0.414)
kelihood -3746.821
rvations 4,156
otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.



























Table 5.3 Predicted Probability of Employment Status by Year 
 
Predicted Probability
1989 (N = 2,388)
Not Working, Not in School 0.12 0.095 0.138
In School 0.04 0.024 0.055
State/Collective Sector 0.42 0.379 0.454
Private/Other Sector 0.09 0.075 0.111
Farming 0.33 0.292 0.378
1997 (N = 1,768)
Not Working, Not in School 0.18 0.150 0.211
In School 0.09 0.068 0.112
State/Collective Sector 0.25 0.246 0.310
Private/Other Sector 0.28 0.167 0.234
































Table 5.4 Predicted Probability of Employment Status by Education 
Predicted Probability
Primary School or Less (N = 984)
Not Working, Not in School 0.05 0.037 0.067
In School 0.00 0.001 0.008
State/Collective Sector 0.09 0.073 0.117
Private/Other Sector 0.08 0.060 0.098
Farming 0.77 0.735 0.804
Middle School (N = 2,079)
Not Working, Not in School 0.15 0.121 0.170
In School 0.04 0.025 0.048
State/Collective Sector 0.32 0.290 0.353
Private/Other Sector 0.15 0.127 0.173
Farming 0.35 0.309 0.385
High School or More (N = 1,093)
Not Working, Not in School 0.11 0.082 0.131
In School 0.41 0.362 0.455
State/Collective Sector 0.38 0.340 0.418
Private/Other Sector 0.09 0.064 0.106


























Year (year 1989 is omitted)
Year 1997 1.033** -0.568 -0.107 1.871** 1.978**
(0.374) (1.079) (0.387) (0.322) (0.413)
Education (primary school or less is omitted)
Middle School 0.592** 1.893** 0.751** 0.580* -0.171
(0.226) (0.376) (0.175) (0.236) (0.236)
High schoor or above 0.833* 4.771** 1.401** 1.062** -0.340
(0.332) (0.415) (0.256) (0.349) (0.316)
Interactive Effect
Year 1997*Middle School 0.174 1.088 0.428 -0.228 -0.655
(0.368) (1.089) (0.387) (0.311) (0.415)
Year 1997*High School or above 0.646 1.863 1.035* 0.040 -0.995*
(0.485) (1.108) (0.460) (0.448) (0.472)
Other Variables (results not shown)
Constant 2.397** -1.238 3.241** 1.344* -1.897**
(0.692) (0.752) (0.640) (0.683) (0.367)
Log Likelihood -3740.657
Observations 4,156
Notes: The model include all the independent variables in Table 5.2. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses































Predicted Probability Predicted Probability
Primary School or Less
Not Working, Not in School 0.05 0.032 0.068 0.06 0.030 0.082
In School 0.01 0.001 0.010 0.00 -0.001 0.004
State/Collective Sector 0.12 0.094 0.155 0.04 0.016 0.064
Private/Other Sector 0.05 0.032 0.068 0.18 0.133 0.229
Farming 0.77 0.726 0.813 0.72 0.661 0.783
Number of observations 694 290
Middle School
Not Working, Not in School 0.12 0.096 0.148 0.16 0.128 0.199
In School 0.03 0.019 0.047 0.04 0.025 0.050
State/Collective Sector 0.43 0.388 0.474 0.19 0.160 0.226
Private/Other Sector 0.09 0.070 0.114 0.26 0.226 0.301
Farming 0.32 0.275 0.370 0.34 0.299 0.386
Number of observations 1,203 876
High School or Above
Not Working, Not in School 0.08 0.050 0.110 0.12 0.092 0.158
In School 0.32 0.253 0.383 0.46 0.404 0.515
State/Collective Sector 0.52 0.455 0.577 0.28 0.235 0.319
Private/Other Sector 0.06 0.031 0.079 0.12 0.092 0.157
Farming 0.03 0.016 0.046 0.01 0.007 0.021
Number of observations 491 602





Table 5.7 Predicted Probability of Employment Status by Family Background in the 
State/Collective Sector 
Predicted Probability
Not Working, Not in School 0.15 0.124 0.169
In School 0.07 0.048 0.086
State/Collective Sector 0.66 0.624 0.687
Private/Other Sector 0.09 0.075 0.110
Farming 0.04 0.026 0.051
Not Working, Not in School 0.07 0.057 0.087
In School 0.03 0.016 0.035
State/Collective Sector 0.11 0.089 0.121
Private/Other Sector 0.12 0.098 0.133
Farming 0.68 0.654 0.709
With Other Family Member in
State/Collective Sector (N = 1,849)
Without Other Family Member in
































Table 5.8 Predicted Probability of Employment Status by Family Background in the 
Private/Other Sector 
Predicted Probability
Not Working, Not in School 0.18 0.143 0.210
In School 0.06 0.045 0.085
State/Collective Sector 0.28 0.245 0.318
Private/Other Sector 0.38 0.339 0.426
Farming 0.09 0.071 0.118
Not Working, Not in School 0.13 0.104 0.147
In School 0.05 0.034 0.069
State/Collective Sector 0.35 0.313 0.379
Private/Other Sector 0.10 0.085 0.122
Farming 0.37 0.332 0.416
With Other Family Member in
Private/Other Sector (N = 1,064)
Without Other Family Member in
































Table 5.9 Predicted Probability of Employment Status by Family Background in 
Farming 
Predicted Probability
Not Working, Not in School 0.05 0.037 0.058
In School 0.02 0.015 0.031
State/Collective Sector 0.10 0.090 0.119
Private/Other Sector 0.08 0.071 0.098
Farming 0.74 0.719 0.762
Not Working, Not in School 0.22 0.193 0.249
In School 0.06 0.044 0.081
State/Collective Sector 0.61 0.577 0.640
Private/Other Sector 0.10 0.077 0.114
Farming 0.01 0.007 0.017
95% Confidence Interval
With Other Family Member in
Farming (N = 2,616)
Without Other Family Member in














































Year (year 1989 is omitted)
Year 1997 1.138** 0.683* 0.375 1.783** 1.408**
(0.272) (0.289) (0.229) (0.248) (0.272)
Having Other Family Member in State/Collective Sector (no  is omitted)
Yes 0.351 0.537* 1.533** 0.521* -1.012**
(0.249) (0.253) (0.196) (0.239) (0.247)
Interactive Effect
Year 1997*With Family Member in
State/collective Sector 0.139 0.087 -0.016 -0.214 -0.198
(0.333) (0.328) (0.295) (0.303) (0.304)
Other Variables (results not shown)
Constant 2.390** -1.424 3.151** 1.366* -1.785**
(0.688) (0.747) (0.632) (0.673) (0.360)
Log Likelihood -3746.058
Observations 4,156
Notes: The model include all the independent variables in Table 5.2. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses























Year (year 1989 is omitted)
Year 1997 1.190** 0.496 0.195 1.460** 1.265**
(0.266) (0.281) (0.207) (0.259) (0.247)
Having Other Family Member in Private/Other Sector (no  is omitted)
Yes 0.920** 0.565* 0.380* 1.765** 1.386**
(0.233) (0.260) (0.179) (0.242) (0.214)
Interactive Effect
Year 1997*With Family Member in
Private/Other Sector 0.364 1.006** 0.785** 0.751* -0.034
(0.349) (0.359) (0.293) (0.330) (0.294)
Other Variables (results not shown)
Constant 2.326** -1.343 3.209** 1.553* -1.656**
(0.693) (0.752) (0.644) (0.678) (0.350)
Log Likelihood -3739.777
Observations 4,156
Notes: The model include all the independent variables in Table 5.2. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses























Year (year 1989 is omitted)
Year 1997 0.704 0.433 -0.084 1.350** 1.434**
(0.458) (0.470) (0.425) (0.454) (0.256)
Having Other Family Member in Farming (no  is omitted)
Yes -4.197** -2.544** -3.310** -2.688** 0.623*
(0.351) (0.324) (0.263) (0.326) (0.245)
Interactive Effect
Year 1997*With Family Member in
Farming 0.808 0.165 0.529 0.305 -0.224
(0.477) (0.460) (0.421) (0.458) (0.281)
Other Variables (results not shown)
Constant 2.517** -1.450 3.282** 1.497* -1.785**
(0.691) (0.759) (0.642) (0.681) (0.360)
Log Likelihood -3743.869
Observations 4,156
Notes: The model include all the independent variables in Table 5.2. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses







Table 5.13 Predicted Probability of Employment Status by Family Background in Private/Other Sector and Year 
Predicted Probability Predicted Probability
Not Working, Not in School 0.14 0.097 0.177 0.20 0.127 0.273
In School 0.06 0.033 0.082 0.04 0.018 0.066
State/Collective Sector 0.34 0.285 0.392 0.18 0.132 0.233
Private/Other Sector 0.25 0.195 0.304 0.48 0.371 0.586
Farming 0.22 0.163 0.275 0.10 0.061 0.134
Number of observations 575 489
Not Working, Not in School 0.09 0.067 0.121 0.20 0.151 0.240
In School 0.06 0.034 0.078 0.06 0.035 0.082
State/Collective Sector 0.40 0.346 0.452 0.31 0.261 0.353
Private/Other Sector 0.07 0.050 0.097 0.20 0.160 0.241
Farming 0.38 0.320 0.435 0.24 0.188 0.289
Number of observations 1,813 1,279
Without Other Family Member
in Private/Other Sector
With Other Family Member in
Private/Other Sector
1989 1997




























Year (year 1989 is omitted)
Year 1997 1.600** 0.762** 0.323 1.422** 1.100**
(0.283) (0.290) (0.220) (0.253) (0.245)
Gender (male is omitted)
Female 0.531** 0.040 -0.160 -0.497* -0.337
(0.202) (0.213) (0.153) (0.210) (0.200)
Interactive Effect
Year 1997*Female -0.730** -0.064 0.102 0.668* 0.565*
(0.276) (0.285) (0.234) (0.266) (0.270)
Other Variables (results not shown)
Constant 2.084** -1.469* 3.172** 1.676* -1.496**
(0.691) (0.745) (0.632) (0.667) (0.345)
Log Likelihood -3735.647
Observations 4,156
Notes: The model include all the independent variables in Table 5.2. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses








Table 5.15 Predicted Probability of Employment Status by Gender and Year 
Predicted Probability Predicted Probability
Male
Not Working, Not in School 0.08 0.055 0.099 0.19 0.153 0.231
In School 0.04 0.028 0.062 0.11 0.079 0.132
State/Collective Sector 0.41 0.366 0.456 0.26 0.223 0.301
Private/Other Sector 0.11 0.086 0.141 0.25 0.209 0.288
Farming 0.35 0.305 0.404 0.19 0.155 0.230
Number of observations 1,181 930
Female
Not Working, Not in School 0.16 0.127 0.191 0.17 0.133 0.206
In School 0.03 0.018 0.051 0.07 0.050 0.099
State/Collective Sector 0.42 0.371 0.468 0.24 0.197 0.280
Private/Other Sector 0.07 0.052 0.093 0.31 0.265 0.354
Farming 0.32 0.260 0.370 0.21 0.166 0.249
Number of observations 1,207 838























All (N = 2,510) 75.0 5.1 11.5 8.4
By Original Sector
State/Collective Sector 66.8 ------ 12.8 20.4
(N = 888)
Private/Other Sector 59.5 16.7 ------ 23.8
(N = 126)
Family Contract Farming 81.2 7.2 11.7 ------
































































mployment Sector in 1989 (state/collective sector is omitted except for model 2)
Farming -0.776** -0.598 0.751** ------
(0.171) (0.345) (0.249) ------
Private/Other 0.144 ------ -0.120
(0.238) ------ (0.337)
ducation in 1989 (middle school is omitted)
No schooling -0.321 -0.870* -0.799** 1.577**
(0.185) (0.369) (0.294) (0.418)
Primary -0.186 -0.476* -0.280 0.178
(0.128) (0.239) (0.176) (0.265)
High school or above -0.126 0.079 -0.026 -0.070
(0.140) (0.315) (0.173) (0.262)
ender (male is omitted)
Female -0.386** -0.706** -0.420** 0.314
(0.112) (0.247) (0.149) (0.221)
her Family Member in State/Collective Sector in 1989 (no is omitted)
Yes 0.556** 0.923** -0.126 0.481
(0.182) (0.324) (0.267) (0.321)
her Family Member in Private/Other Sector in 1989 (no is omitted)
Yes 0.140 0.036 0.387 -0.100
(0.159) (0.351) (0.201) (0.334)
her Family Member in Farming in 1989 (no is omitted)
Yes -0.135 -0.445 -0.215 0.506
(0.194) (0.319) (0.276) (0.329)
89 (age 30 to 39 is omitted)
Age 20 to 29 0.133 -0.508 0.463** -0.230
(0.129) (0.272) (0.166) (0.265)
Age 40 to 49 -0.316* -0.158 -0.493* -0.100
(0.148) (0.279) (0.199) (0.335)
us in 1989 (unmarried is omitted)
Married -0.197 0.516 -0.172 -0.440














































ving Child (Age<7) in Family in 1989 (no is omitted)
Yes 0.067 -0.131 -0.078 0.040
(0.117) (0.215) (0.157) (0.259)
ving Elderly (Age>=60) in Family in 1989 (no is omitted)
Yes -0.312* -0.378 -0.355* -0.062
(0.138) (0.294) (0.180) (0.281)
umber of Other Working Age (20-49) Adults in 1989 (two or more is omitted)
Self only 0.539 1.786** 0.875 -2.402
(0.390) (0.643) (0.486) (1.528)
One 0.131 0.374 0.315 -0.199
(0.184) (0.423) (0.247) (0.413)
nnual Family Income (yuan) in 1989 (3,000 to 4,999 is omitted)
< 1,000 0.305 0.558 -0.392 2.178**
(0.202) (0.338) (0.307) (0.589)
1,000 to 2,999 0.170 -0.217 -0.243 1.132**
(0.130) (0.258) (0.183) (0.261)
5,000 to 6,999 -0.116 -0.290 0.320 -0.698*
(0.177) (0.357) (0.206) (0.346)
>= 7,000 0.583** 0.374 0.777** 0.127
(0.163) (0.306) (0.199) (0.335)
esidence in 1989 (city is omitted)
Suburb 2.036** 1.218 0.207 3.826**
(0.258) (0.858) (0.305) (1.038)
Town 1.854** -1.148 1.394** 3.264**
(0.253) (1.098) (0.266) (1.052)
Village 2.203** 0.475 -0.228 5.549**
(0.248) (0.855) (0.313) (1.027)
vince (central provinces are omitted)
Coast -0.156 0.661** 0.480* -1.410**
(0.130) (0.247) (0.192) (0.230)
West -0.236 -1.048** 0.731** -0.980**
(0.126) (0.281) (0.161) (0.358)
nstant -2.541** -2.175 -2.625** -5.333**
(0.474) (1.195) (0.623) (1.235)
og Likelihood -1272.312 -379.831 -789.350 -316.012
2,510 1,622 2,384 1,014
otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.













































 Robust standard errors in pare
 * sig








ender (male is omitted)
Female -0.386** 0.896 0.146
(0.112) (0.614) (0.166)
Married -0.197 0.070 -0.159
(0.316) (0.354) (0.313)
Private/Other 0.144 0.122 0.216
(0.238) (0.238) (0.278)









er Variables (results not shown)
onstant -2.416** -2.686** -2.714**
(0.476) (0.493) (0.486)
elihood -1272.312 -1270.333 -1261.689
servations 2,510 2,510 2,510
otes: All the 3 models include all the independent variables in Model 1 of Table 6.2. 
ntheses
nificant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
loyment Sector in 1989


















Table 6.4 Predicted Probability of Changing Employment Sector by Gender and 
Marital Status 
Predicted Probability
Married Men (N = 1,290) 0.27 0.240 0.293
Unmarried Men (N = 61) 0.28 0.159 0.392
Married Women (N = 1,143) 0.18 0.154 0.199








































Table 6.5 Predicted Probability of Changing Employment Sector by Gender and 
Employment Sector 
Predicted Probability
Men from State/Collective Sector (N = 550) 0.29 0.246 0.330
Men from Private/Other Sector (N = 84) 0.42 0.303 0.529
Men from Family Farming (N = 717) 0.24 0.209 0.272
Women from State/Collective Sector (N= 338) 0.30 0.248 0.354
Women from Private/Other Sector (N = 42) 0.32 0.172 0.476





































Table 6.6 The Gender Effects on Moving to the State/Collective Sector: Without and 
With Interactions 








Gender (male is omitted)
Female -0.706** 0.599 0.689
(0.247) (1.213) (0.664)
Married 0.516 0.826 0.648
(0.528) (0.623) (0.524)







Other Variables (results not shown)
Constant -2.254 -2.596* -3.139*
(1.164) (1.197) (1.237)
Log Likelihood -379.831 -379.422 -376.947
Observations 1,622 1,622 1,622
Notes: All the 3 models include all the independent variables in Model 2 of Table 6.2. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Marital Status in 1989
(unmarried is omitted)
Employment Sector in 1989

















Table 6.7 Predicted Probability of Moving to the State/Collective Sector by Gender 
and Employment Sector 
Predicted Probability
Men from Private/Other Sector (N = 84) 0.10 0.034 0.166
Men from Family Farming (N = 717) 0.07 0.050 0.088
Women from Private/Other Sector (N = 42) 0.11 0.002 0.220




































Table 6.8 The Gender Effects on Moving to the Private/Other Sector: Without and 
With Interactions 








Gender (male is omitted)
Female -0.420** 1.009 -0.022
(0.149) (0.689) (0.227)
Married -0.172 0.129 -0.169
(0.440) (0.484) (0.424)







Other Variables (results not shown)
Constant -2.599** -2.918** -2.782**
(0.633) (0.651) (0.637)
Log Likelihood -789.350 -787.765 -786.713
Observations 2,384 2,384 2,384
Notes: All the 3 models include all the independent variables in Model 3 of Table 6.2. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Marital Status in 1989
(unmarried is omitted)
Employment Sector in 1989

















Table 6.9 Predicted Probability of Moving to the Private/Other Sector by Gender and 
Marital Status 
Predicted Probability
Married Men (N = 1,208) 0.11 0.096 0.134
Unmarried Men (N = 59) 0.14 0.051 0.228
Married Women (N = 1,104) 0.07 0.059 0.091








































Table 6.10 Predicted Probability of Moving to the Private/Other Sector by Gender 
and Employment Sector 
Predicted Probability
Men from State/Collective Sector (N = 550) 0.10 0.072 0.125
Men from Family Farming (N = 717) 0.13 0.106 0.154
Women from State/Collective Sector (N= 338) 0.10 0.070 0.132








































Table 6.11 The Gender Effects on Moving to the Family Farming: Without and With 
Interactions 








Gender (male is omitted)
Female 0.314 -0.039 0.538*
(0.221) (1.244) (0.239)
Married -0.440 -0.557 -0.499
(0.550) (0.640) (0.533)







Other Variables (results not shown)
Constant -5.263** -5.146** -5.212**
(1.271) (1.315) (1.265)
Log Likelihood -316.012 -315.977 -313.019
Observations 1,014 1,014 1,014
Notes: All the 3 models include all the independent variables in Model 4 of Table 6.2. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Marital Status in 1989
(unmarried is omitted)
Employment Sector in 1989
















Table 6.12 Predicted Probability of Moving to Family Farming by Gender and 
Employment Sector 
Predicted Probability
Men from State/Collective Sector (N = 550) 0.06 0.030 0.097
Men from Private/Other Sector (N = 84) 0.18 0.092 0.266
Women from State/Collective Sector (N= 338) 0.06 0.015 0.104
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